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THE SEMANTICS OF INSANITY
GERTRUDE BLOCK*
The modern insanity defense is rooted in the concept that mens rea
(a guilty or vicious mind) is necessary for crime. For hundreds of years,
the statement, Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea ("An act does
not make [the actor] guilty unless his mind is guilty"), has been the
legal basis for criminal responsibility.'
But the concept of mens rea was not always a part of common law.
Anglo-Saxon law held that intent was not a necessary element of crime.
The act itself was considered rather than the intent behind it, and repara-
tion was demanded of the actor for the consequences of his act.' The
law required compensation in the interest of peace rather than punish-
ment of the offender; to avoid the blood feud that would otherwise
result, compensation was made to the injured person, or in the case
of murder, to his kin.3 Compensation was awarded, as well, to the
feudal lord for the death or injury of his servant. Thus, enforced repara-
tion replaced the eye-for-eye justice of the blood feud.4
Beginning in the ninth century, concern for the criminal's eternal
soul and belief in the Augustinian doctrine of free will led the Church
to abandon the objective standard of responsibility for crime and to
adopt instead a subjective standard, based on the actor's state of mind
when he committed his act.5 If the actor intended freely to commit
the crime, he should be punished not only in heaven but also on earth.
Conversely, the actor who lacked the evil will to commit the crime
did not deserve punishment, since he was not "a free moral agent .... "
6
Given the presumption of the medieval church that free will and
intent to do wrong were necessary elements of crime, criminal law no
longer sought only to regulate compensation, but expanded, under Pope
Gregory the Great, to include atonement as well.' The evildoer, at once
* Writing Specialist, University of Florida College of Law, Gainesville, Fla.-Ed.
1. E. CoKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 6 (1809).
2. Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARv. L. REv. 974, 977 (1932).
3. Note, Mental Abnormalities in the Maine Criminal Code: Section 58 (]-A), 33 ME. L.
REV. 35, 40-41 (1981). See also 2 W. HoLDswoRTi, HISroRY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 47-51 (4th
ed. 1936).
4. The Anglo-Saxon epic Beowulf provides an excellent description of this justice.
5. Levitt, Extent and Function of the Doctrine of Mens Rea, 17 ILL. L. REV. 578 (1923).
6. Id. at 579. Modern faith in the rehabilitation of criminals may be rooted in the Christian
belief that both repentance and forgiveness for evil actions are possible until death.
7. Levitt, The Origin of tht Doctrine of Mens Rea, 17 ILL. L. REV. 117, 131 (1922).
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both criminal and sinner, must compensate for both,8 and his moral
guilt decided his punishment.9 Thus was born the modern doctrine
of mens rea, out of which has emerged the insanity defense.'0
This article will discuss the history of the insanity defense, the ef-
forts of courts to improve the defense by changing its language, " the
response of juries to the defense, the addition in some jurisdictions
of the guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) verdict,'2 and the growing de-
mand for the abolition of the insanity defense.
History of the Insanity Defense
The M'Naghten Test
Lord Coke first expressed the mens rea doctrine that underlies the
insanity defense almost four hundred years ago when he said that "no
felony or murder can be committed without a felonious intent and pur-
pose, ... " and a person deprived of his reason "cannot have a
felonious intent...." 3  Lord Coke's statement might well have led
to an inquiry into whether the accused possessed the requisite criminal
intent, obviating the need for an insanity defense. Instead, semantic
interpretation directed the inquiry away from "intent" and toward "ex-
tent," and the question became not whether the accused had the requi-
site criminal intent, but how much incapacity on the part of the accused
would excuse an act that would otherwise be criminal. 4 The legal con-
sideration became not whether the accused intended his act, but whether
his diseased mind negated whatever intent he possessed. The test
generally employed was whether the defendant was able to distinguish
between good and evil (later right and wrong), and at first the yard-
stick for this determination was the general behavior of the individual.'I
But in an 1843 English case,'6 the defense counsel argued that the
right/wrong standard should be applied, not to the individual's general
behavior but to the particular act for which he was being tried.
8. Id. at 137.
9. Id. at 135.
10. Id. at 135-37. The doctrine has often been reiterated, as in Carter v. United States, 252
F.2d 608, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1957):
If a man is amens (id est) sine mente [without mind, that is, without mental choice]
in respect to an act to such an extent that in doing the act he is not a free agent
or not making a choice, or unknowing of the difference between right and wrong,
or not choosing freely, or not acting freely, he is outside the postulate of the law
of punishment.
11. These include especially the decisions in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1954) and United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
12. See discussion infra, "The Guilty But Mentally Ill Alternative."
13. Beverley's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1118, 1121 (K.B.) (1892).
14. Id.
15. Spring, The End of Insanity, 19 WAss-au±rN L.J. 23, 24 (1979).
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In that year, Daniel M'Naghten, while suffering from the delusion
that Sir Robert Peel, the Pope, and the Jesuits were conspiring to
persecute him, set out to kill Sir Robert Peel, leader of the Tory party
and then prime minister of England. M'Naghten's trial was the first
to include psychiatric testimony. Defense counsel quoted at length from
Dr. Isaac Ray's 1838 book on insanity (Medical Jurisprudence of
Insanity),'7 and called medical experts who testified that M'Naghten
suffered from delusions so strong as to override his moral perception
of right and wrong, thus rendering him incapable of controlling his
actions. The jury found M'Naghten insane, and he spent the rest of
his life in a mental institution. So great a public furor arose that Parlia-
ment debated whether the M'Naghten decision would enable numerous
criminals to be excused for their crimes. In response to Parliament's
request, Lord Chief Justice Tindal formulated what has become the
official statement of the M'Naghten rule:
[T]he jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is presumed
to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be respon-
sible for his crimes until the contrary be proved to their satisfac-
tion; and that to establish a defense on the ground of insanity,
it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of
the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing; or if, he did know it, that he did
not know he was doing what was wrong.'
The M'Naghten rule was adopted in the United States 138 years ago
and is still used, with little modification, by twenty states.'9 Psychiatrists,
however, have vigorously attacked the M'Naghten rule on the grounds
that (1) it does not correspond to modem psychiatric knowledge because
few if any persons can be said to lack totally the capacity to distinguish
right from wrong; (2) its premise (of a mind compartmentalized into
will, emotions, and intellect) is outdated; and (3) it prevents testimony
by experts about psychiatric insights into aspects of behavior-other
than the cognitive functions-that are relevant to the problem of
responsibility.
20
16. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & F 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
17. Weiner, Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity: A Sane Approach, 56 Cm.[-]KENT L. REV.
1057, 1059 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Weiner].
18. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & F 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843) (emphasis added).
19. Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Washington. Weiner, supra note 17, at 1084 app. A.
20. See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 870-74 (D.C. Cir. 1954). See also A. GOLD-
STEiN, TIE INsANrry DEFENSE 46 (1967). The premise of a tripartite mind is at least as old as
Plato. See THE REPUBuC, ch. XIII.
1983]
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With regard to the first two grounds, it can be argued that any in-
sanity test relies on false psychiatric notions." As for the third objec-
tion, early in the use of the M'Naghten rule, courts often interpreted
the word "know" to mean volitional control as well as cognitive
knowledge. In a Pennsylvania murder case, only three years after
M'Naghten, the supreme court justices instructed the jury that in order
to constitute insanity so as to excuse his act, the mental disability of
the defendant must be so severe as to "destroy his perception of right
and wrong .... It must amount to delusion or hallucination, controlling
his will and making the commission of the act, in his apprehension,
a duty of overruling necessity.
' 22
The Pennsylvania court thus expanded the definition of knowledge
to include the ability to control one's actions. The justices then added
to M'Naghten the "moral or homicidal mania" doctrine: "But there
is a moral or homicidal insanity, consisting of an irresistible inclina-
tion to kill, or to commit some other particular offense. There may
be an unseen ligament pressing on the mind, incapable of resistance.
'2
The "irresistible inclination" required in Pennsylvania's "moral or
homicidal insanity" doctrine is substantially the "irresistible impulse"
doctrine adopted by other jurisdictions to supplement M'Naghten.
24
In these jurisdictions, despite the possibility that the accused may have
known the nature and consequences of his act and that it was wrong,
if he committed the act because of an impulse he was powerless to
control because of a disease of the mind, he will be excused.5
The California Supreme Court, in People v. Woiff, " further expanded
M'Naghten to include examination of the defendant's ability to reflect
maturely and meaningfully upon the morality and gravity of his con-
templated act," denying the insanity defense only to those who truly
understand the "moral evil" of their conduct. California courts also
developed the "diminished responsibility" concept to further reduce
the harshness of M'Naghten. In one line of cases, evidence of diminished
mental capacity tending to disprove criminal intent was allowed at trial.
2
And in a 1973 case, both diminished capacity and irresistible impulse
were allowed as defenses."9
21. See discussion infra in text accompanying notes 41-50.
22. Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264, 266 (1846).
23. Id. at 267 (emphasis in original).
24. See 21 Am. JuR. 2d Criminal Law § 60 (1981). These jurisdictions include Arkansas,
Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Montana, and Utah.
25. Id.
26. 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
27. Id. at 800-01, 394 P.2d at 961-62, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 274.
28. See People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949).
29. People v. Cantrell, 8 Cal. 3d 672, 504 P.2d 1256, 105 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1973). The court
stated that a defendant who raises the defense of diminished capacity at the guilt phase of trial
[Vol. 36:561
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A District of Columbia court, as early as 1895, responded to the
criticism that M'Naghten too narrowly defined insanity by expanding
the definition of "knowing" in a jury instruction to include "respon-
sibly appreciating."30 Thus if the defendant did know the difference
between right and wrong but failed to appreciate "responsibly" that
difference, he would succeed in his insanity plea. Later the District
of Columbia added as well the "irresistible impulse" test in the 1929
case of Smith v. United States:
The mere ability to distinguish right from wrong is no longer the
correct test either in civil or criminal cases, where the defense of
insanity is interposed. The accepted rule . . . is that the accused
must be capable, not only of distinguishing between right and
wrong, but that he was not impelled to do the act by an irresistible
impulse .... 3,
The more additions to the M'Naghten right/wrong test, the more
confusing it became. In the cases cited above, "diminished capacity"
merely seems another term for "mental illness or insanity," and "moral
or homicidal mania" is indistinguishable, in the Pennsylvania ruling,
from "irresistible impulse." But in two cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court rejected the "irresistible impulse" defense, while approvingly
citing Mosler, which had expanded M'Naghten to include "irresistible
impulse."32
The confusion accompanying M'Naghten is caused not only by its
expansion by the courts, but also because of difficulties inherent in
the insanity test itself. There are, for example, no objective methods
for determining when a defendant could not control his behavior and
when he could, but would not, i.e., when the impulse was irresistible
and when it was only unresisted.3 With regard to the act in question,
it is thus impossible to determine objectively whether the defendant
was mad or merely bad.3 4 Furthermore, the concept of "irresistible
impulse," when used as an insanity defense, collides with another
criminal law concept, the "heat of passion," which is a mitigating factor,
but not a complete defense for culpability, as is the insanity defense.3
must be permitted to demonstrate that his act was the product of an irresistible impulse resulting
from mental disease. Id. at 685, 504 P.2d at 1264, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
30. Travers v. United States, 6 App. D.C. 450, 464 (1895).
31. 36 F.2d 548, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
32. Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 256-59, 164 A.2d 98, 106-07 (1960); Common-
wealth v. Daverse, 364 Pa. 623, 625, 73 A.2d 405, 406 (1950).
33. Critics point out that persons allegedly unable to resist temptation do so when a "policeman
is at the elbow." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 comments at 158 (Tent. Draft No. 4 1955).
34. This defect is not unique to M'Naghten; it is common to all insanity rules and is cited
by those who would eliminate the insanity defense as one reason for so doing. See discussion
infra in text accompanying notes 129-132.
35. For the effect of the "heat of passion" in reducing the degree of homicide, see 40 AM.
19831
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The Durham Test
In a 1954 landmark decision, the United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit, replaced the M'Naghten plus "irresisti-
ble impulse" test with a new test of criminal responsibility, since called
the Durham test.6 Monte Durham, the defendant in the case, had ap-
pealed a district court decision convicting him of housebreaking, his
only defense being that he was of unsound mind at the time of his
act. He had a long history of imprisonment and hospitalization, hav-
ing been in and out of jails and mental institutions, discharged from
the latter each time as cured. His third discharge from Saint Elizabeth's
Hospital for the mentally ill occurred only two months before the crime
for which he had been found guilty. According to the psychiatrist who
examined him following his indictment for housebreaking, he had suf-
fered from hallucinations immediately following his third discharge from
Saint Elizabeth's.3 Following his indictment for housebreaking, he was
admitted to Saint Elizabeth's for the fourth time, then released again
after sixteen months as mentally competent to stand trial. The district
court rejected his defense of insanity on the ground that it had not
been established that Durham did not know the difference between
right and wrong or that he was subject to an irresistible impulse by
reason of the derangement of mind.38 The court of appeals reversed
and remanded, holding that the trial court had erred in finding no
evidence of mental disorder; such evidence would have placed the burden
upon the prosecution to prove the defendant sane beyond a reasonable
doubt.
39
At the trial no one questioned the swinging door character of
Durham's commitments at Saint Elizabeth's. Nor did anyone question
the inability of the psychiatric staff of the hospital to decide whether
he was sane.40 The district court might well have decided on the basis
of the evidence to reject any insanity defense because of the inability
JUR. 2d Homicide § 56 (1968): "The distinction between murder and voluntary manslaughter
is found in the dividing line between malicious action on the one hand and action in the heat
of passion on the other."
36. Durham v. United States 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
37. Id. at 864.
38. Id. at 865.
39. Id. at 867-69.
40. On two of his four commitments, Durham had been diagnosed as a "psychopath." This
term and the term "sociopath" refer to persons whose behavior is antisocial; they are so diagnosed
generally by reason of their antisocial behavior. Prosecuting attorneys argued at trial that Durham
was a malingerer, feigning insanity whenever he was caught, but failed to present any expert
testimony to support this theory. In response to questioning, one psychiatrist indicated that his
diagnosis of Durham's hallucinations was reached as a result of Durham's own statements. Id.
at 867 n. 10.
[Vol. 36:561
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of the test to determine insanity. Instead the court decided to replace
the MNaghten test with a new test for determining insanity, on the
assumption that a new test would work if it was couched in modern
terminology.
Writing the decision, Judge Bazelon repeated psychiatric criticisms
of MNaghten:
We find that as an exclusive criterion the right-wrong test is
inadequate in that (a) it does not take sufficient account of psychic
realities and scientific knowledge, and (b) it is based upon one symp-
tom and so cannot validly be applied in all circumstances. We find
that the "irresistible impulse" test is also inadequate in that it gives
no recognition to mental illness characterized by brooding and
reflection and so relegates acts caused by such illness to the ap-
plication of the inadequate right-wrong test. We conclude that a
broader test should be adopted."
The new test, which had been used by the New Hampshire court
since 1870, would now be the rule of the District of Columbia. In an-
nouncing it, Judge Bazelon approved of its simplicity: A defendant
"is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of
mental disease or mental defect."4 2 Simple the test was; it was also
confusing. Although heralded as bringing the test of insanity in line
with modern psychiatry, psychiatrists widely criticized it, one calling
it "a peculiar mixture of Aristotlean faculty and psychology, meta-
physics, mysticism, and medieval theology."4 3
Others were hardly more pleased with the new test. To some
psychiatrists the term "mental disease" in the Durham test is vague;
to others it is wholly meaningless, for modern psychiatrists are not
in agreement that mental disease exists, or that if it does, it can be
defined and classified. Dr. John Cavanaugh, for example, citing various
psychiatrists, argues that the term "disease" as applied to mental con-
ditions should be dropped because it is misleading." Dr. Cavanaugh
also cites numerous psychiatrists to show that mental disorders are a
matter of degree, not specific diseases." Even substituting "mental
illness" or "mental disorder" would lead to difficulty because they
include a wide range of disorders, Dr. Cavanaugh concludes.6
41. Id. at 874.
42. Id. at 874-75.
43. Savage, Discussion, 116 AM. J. oF PsycmxrsRY 295, 296 (1959), cited in Blocker v. United
States, 288 F.2d 853, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
44. Cavanaugh, A Psychiatrist Looks at the Durham Decision, 5 CATH. U.L. REv. 25, 30
(1955).
45. Id. at 28-34.
46. Id. at 32-34.
1983]
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Those psychiatrists who believe that mental disease does not even
exist argue that its existence is erroneously posited by analogy with
physical disease.' But, they explain, the analogy between medicine and
psychiatry is misleading; because the mind is nonexistent physically,
to describe it as either healthy or sick is "unadulterated nonsense.""8
These psychiatrists point out that mental disease is only a theory used
to explain the individual actions, and to assume that theories are facts
is "a perversion of our language and thought." 9 In short, a theory
can never be a cause. Yet under the Durham rule, note these detrac-
tors, once the defense of insanity is raised it is considered a matter
of fact for the jury to decide whether the accused suffered from men-
tal disease or defect at the commission of the act with which he is
charged and whether the.disease or defect "caused" the act. "Clearly,
the question itself is improper.""
Even assuming, arguendo, the existence of "mental disease or defect,"
the Durham test suffers from vagueness in that it does not define the
terms, merely differentiating between the two conditions. "Mental
disease" is defined as a condition capable of improving or deteriorating;
"mental illness" is defined as a static condition.' That distinction seems
irrelevant because both conditions are exculpatory under Durham. More
troubling, however, is that some psychiatrists consider psychopathy (or
sociopathy, another name for the same condition)" a mental defect
while others do not. And those who do consider that condition a men-
tal defect are split into two schools, the "psychodynamic" school and
the "social history" school." The former group of psychiatrists con-
siders the mental condition as reflecting a serious underlying disturbance,
discoverable by a penetrating psychiatric examination.4 The latter group
believes that no such examination is valid or necessary to determine
the mental condition, only a history of "trouble, of shiftlessness, or
nomadism, of dishonesty, of nonconformity, of mischief, or of some
similar trait.""5 For this latter group of psychiatrists, criminal behavior
per se would indicate mental disease or defect (i.e., psychopathy or
sociopathy) and would therefore excuse criminal acts under Durham.
47. See, e.g., T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 11-17 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
SzAsz].
48. Szaz, Psychiatry, Ethics and the Criminal Law, 58 CoLUM. L. REV. 183, 190 (1958).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 191.
51. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
52. See supra note 40.
53. Uelmen, The Psychiatrist, the Sociopath and the Courts: New Lines for an Old Battle,
14 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1, 2 (1980).
54. Id. at 5.
55. Davidson, How Trustworthy is the Witness?, 2 J. FoRENSIC MED. 14, 18 (1955).
[Vol. 36:561
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In fact, a policeman or a file clerk in charge of criminal records would
be the best judge of such a mental disease or defect."
The circular reasoning involved in allowing the very criminal behavior
for which the defendant is being tried to excuse his culpability for such
behavior seems absurd.-" There is also the possibility that a defendant
committed on the basis of expert testimony of psychiatrists who con-
sider psychopathy/sociopathy to be a "mental disease or defect" would,
after commitment, be found to have no mental defect by psychiatrists
who believe that psychopathy/sociopathy is not a mental disease or
defect. He would then be released from commitment.
This is substantially what occurred in the case of In re Rosenfield,"
three years after the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia adopted the Durham test of insanity. In what has come to
be known as the "weekend flip-flop case,"" the petitioner was described
by the testifying Saint Elizabeth's Hospital psychiatrist as a sociopath;
the same expert stated on Friday, November 15, 1957, that a person
with a sociopathic personality did not have a mental disease. On the
following Monday, November 18, 1957, he returned to the witness stand
and announced that on that morning, through a policy change at the
hospital, it had been decided as an administrative matter that a person
with a sociopathic personality did have a mental disease."' Since Saint
Elizabeth's personnel administered all court-ordered psychiatric examina-
tions for the District, this change in nomenclature resulted in a tenfold
increase in the number of acquittals on the ground of insanity.6'
The Rosenfield court, in denying the defendant's petition for release,
said:
It is not beyond the realm of possible contemplation that occa-
sionally a sane, dangerous criminal may be found not guilty on
the ground of insanity and might be turned loose ready to resume
his depredations on the community, if he is not incarcerated
somewhere for an appreciable length of time. 2
56. Hakeem, A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach to Crime and Correction, 23 L. & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 650, 674 (1958).
57. The logical fallacy created by circular reasoning is called petitio principii (begging the
question). W. & M. SAHAKIAN, IDEAS OF THE GREAT PHILOSOPHERS 20 (1971).
58. 157 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1957).
59. The case was thus described by Judge Leventhal in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d
969, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The Rosenfield case is discussed in Brawner as evidence of the failure
of the Durham test to determine insanity.
60. In re Rosenfield, 157 F. Supp. 18, 21 (D.D.C. 1957).
61. Diamond, From M'Naghten to Currens, and Beyond, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 189, 192 & n.19
(1962).
62. 157 F. Supp. 18, 21 (D.D.C. 1957).
19831
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This was what happened in the case of Williams v. United States.3
By age 34, and despite incarceration for much of his life, Williams
had been convicted of ten violent crimes. At age 34 he was charged
with an assault with a deadly weapon and was tried five times on this
charge during the next seven years, two trials ending in mistrials and
three in convictions that were reversed on appeal.6 ' No jury acquitted
Williams on the ground of insanity, although he raised the plea.s The
government sought to commit him civilly following his final reversal,
which precluded a retrial, but the government's application was found
defective because it could not show the existence of mental disease,
and Williams promptly obtained his release from Saint Elizabeth's
Hospital on habeas corpus.66 Within two weeks of his release, he was
arrested on an intoxication charge. This time, without testimony on
the question of his mental condition, the judge found Williams "not
guilty by reason of insanity" and again committed him to Saint
Elizabeth's, but that commitment was held invalid for insufficient
evidence, and Williams was free once again.7 Two years later he
murdered two men.
After a jury trial at which he pleaded not guilty by reason of in-
sanity, Williams was convicted; he appealed, asserting that a directed
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity should have been entered
because the evidence had failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that the offenses were not the product of mental disease or mental
defect.68 As the appellate court judge pointed out in his decision,
Williams's history indicates the failure of society to find a satisfactory
means of restraining offenders like Williams, in whom evidence of in-
sanity is primarily manifested by antisocial behavior.6 9
At Williams's murder trial psychiatric disagreement dominated the
proceedings. Of the eleven psychiatrists who testified, nine agreed that
Williams had a "sociopathic personality" at the time he committed
the murders. Only six psychiatrists considered a sociopathic personality
to be a "mental disease or defect," and of these six, only three believed
that the murders were a "product" of Williams's mental disorder.0
63. 312 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
64. Id. at 863.
65. Id. at 864.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 863. In federal courts and in a substantial number of state courts, the rule is that
once evidence of insanity is introduced, the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant was legally sane at the time of the offense. 21 AM. JUR.
2d Criminal Law § 76 (1981).
69. 312 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
70. Id. at 866.
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As a result of this lack of psychiatric consensus or anything approaching
consensus, the court held that the testimony had failed to raise, as
a matter of law, such reasonable doubt of Williams's sanity as to re-
quire that a directed verdict of acquittal by reason of insanity be entered
by the trial court.7' The court therefore affirmed the lower court
conviction.
Another appeal arising from the label-changing decision of In re
Rosenfield was the case of Blocker v. United States." Blocker, separated
from his common-law wife by whom he had had five children, traveled
from his home in Philadelphia to her Washington, D.C., home, with
the stated intention of killing her. He first threatened with a shotgun
his 14-year-old son, who had answered the door, then shot and killed his
wife. At his trial Blocker relied on the defense of insanity. Two of the
three psychiatrists who testified said that he had a "sociopathic person-
ality disturbance" at the time of the murder.73 The third psychiatrist
said Blocker was sane. The jury, rejecting Blocker's insanity plea, found
him guilty of murder in the first degree.
Then came the weekend change of nomenclature by the staff at Saint
Elizabeth's Hospital, and Blocker promptly appealed the murder con-
viction. Solely because of this change of nomenclature on the part of
Saint Elizabeth's staff physicians (who had not testified at the trial),
Blocker's conviction was reversed .
74
In the new trial, at which no question of sociopathic personality dis-
turbance was raised, two psychiatrists testified. One was a psychiatrist
who had testified at the first trial. He repeated his testimony that Blocker
was sane at the time he committed the murder. The other psychiatrist,
who had examined Blocker for the first time three years after the
murder, testified ",with remarkable hindsight" that he was psychotic
at the time of the crime.71 Again the jury rejected the insanity plea
and found Blocker guilty of murder in the first degree. The defendant
then appealed, on the ground that the language used in the trial judge's
instructions to the jury was internally contradictory and therefore con-
71. Id. at 865. The court said: "We conclude ... that although the defendant's evidence
relating to insanity was sufficient to make the issue, it was not so strong, when considered with
the evidence offered by the Government, as to require a directed verdict of acquittal by reason
thereof." The court thus avoided the question of whether a sociopathic personality was a "mental
disease or defect" under the Durham test. This question was later addressed when the federal
courts adopted the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code test. See infra text accompanying
notes 104-109.
72. 288 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
73. Id. at 874 (Miller, C.J.,. dissenting).
74. Id. Judge Miller points out that none of the three psychiatrists who had testified at the
first trial had changed his opinion about Blocker's mental condition.
75. Id.
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fusing. Although the first and third paragraphs of the instruction clearly
placed the burden upon the prosecution to prove insanity beyond a
reasonable doubt if evidence of a mental disorder was introduced, the
second paragraph seemed to place the burden of proof on the
defendant.76 As a whole, the instruction is an example of legal redun-
dance; in attempting to clarify by repetition, the judge, hoist with his
own petard of verbosity, misstated the rule in his middle paragraph.
Although the court majority held that the case should be reversed
and remanded because of the possibility of confusion in the contradic-
tory instruction, Judge Miller, in a stinging dissent, said that the charge
as a whole was so "crystal clear" that no juror of ordinary intelligence
could have been confused. He criticized the majority decision as being
based upon "a legalistic inference established by purely formal
analysis."
77
It is interesting to note that although the majority opinion quotes
approvingly the jury instruction in Durham as conveying the "sense
and substance" of the rule, that instruction suffers from such an over-
dose of negatives that it would seem to be more puzzling to the average
juror than the court-rejected Blocker charge.7 1 In fact, a much-cited
76. Salient parts of the three paragraphs follow; the second paragraph is the one the majority
held "clearly erroneous":
Basically there is a presumption that all people are sane .... But, when there
is some evidence of a mental disorder, as here in this case, then the presumption
of sanity ... vanishes ... [a]nd the burden is upon the Government to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time in question . . . the defendant...
was of sound mind, or if he suffered from a mental disease or defect ... the
act was not caused by the mental disease or defect....
Now, a person is relieved of the responsibility for a crime by reason of insanity,
where it is found, first, that he was suffering from a mental defect or a mental
disease at the time of the offense, and second, that his act was the product of
that mental defect or disease .... Now, if you find that the defendant . . . did
in fact commit such acts, then you may find [him] not guilty by reason of insanity.
And if you find the Government has proved all of the elements of either first
or second-degree murder but you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the offense
was the result of a mental disease or defect existing in the defendant at the time
he committed the offense, then you must find the defendant not guilty by reason
of insanity .... Now, ladies and gentlemen, it should be crystal clear to you that
when some evidence is introduced to you the presumption of sanity disappears and
the responsibility from that point on is on the Government. It is not a responsibility
which is on the defendant to prove any mental illness or that the mental illness
was the causal effect ... or was the motivating force behind the act in question.
Those are responsibilities for the Government.
Id. at 855-56.
77. Id. at 876-77.
78. Id. at 854. The recommended Durham charge was: "Unless you believe beyond a reasonable
doubt either that he was not suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition, or that
the act was not the product of such abnormality, you must find the accused not guilty by reason
of insanity. [Citations omitted.]"
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1967 study suggests that legal technicalities in insanity defense instruc-
tions often confuse jurors, who therefore tend to ignore them.1 9 For
example, after being offered instructions for both the M'Naghten and
the Durham rules, 317% of the jurors participating in the study did
not see enough difference between the two rules to be able to decide
between them. 0 A 1979 study indicates, further, that the use of simple
construction and language in jury charges appreciably increases jurors'
understanding of what they are being asked to decide.8' These findings
would seem to indicate that the unequivocal and simply stated final
paragraph of the trial judge's instructions in Blocker was considerably
more comprehensible to the jurors than the charge recommended by
the appellate court in its reversal of that decision. Judge Burger,
although concurring in the Blocker opinion, notes that the "vagueness,
lack of clarity, and the psychiatric orientation" of the Durham test
in large part account for the inordinate number of appellate opinions
(more than seventy) written by that court since the adoption of the
Durham rule.1
2
In the 1962 case of McDonald v. United States,3 the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals acknowledged the validity of Judge Burger's
criticism of the Durham rule. The court noted that eight years of ex-
perience under Durham had shown that distinguishing "mental disease"
from "mental defect" was not enough. A definition of the terms was
necessary to avoid ad hoc medical definitions by psychiatrists, resulting
in the control of legal outcomes by medical experts. Medical defini-
tions were inappropriate, said the court, because what psychiatrists might
consider a "mental disease or defect" for clinical purposes, where the
concern is treatment of the patient, may not be the same as "mental
disease or defect" in determining responsibility for an otherwise criminal
act. 4
In order to aid the jury in deciding criminal responsibility, the
McDonald court therefore provided a definition of "mental disease
or defect": "any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially
79. R. SIMON, TH JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY (1967).
80. Id. at 199.
81. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury In-
structions, 79 CoLum. L. REv. 1306 (1979). A recent Justice Department two-year study also
concludes that jury verdicts reflect a misunderstanding of both the law and of what is expected
of them in the decision-making process. In one experiment of 34 volunteer jurors, only one
juror could distinguish between the highest and the lowest murder charge by the judge in connec-
tion with an attempted murder. Elwork, Sales, & Alfini, Making Jury Instructions Understand-
able, Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, June 2, 1981, at 8A.
82. 288 F.2d 853, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
83. 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
84. Id. at 851.
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affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior
controls."8 The court thus hoped to bring to an end psychiatrists'
domination of the insanity defense and the usurpation of the jury's
role in the determination process.
But psychiatrists continued to dominate trials by testifying in con-
clusory terms about the presence of mental disease or defect and whether
the criminal act in question was the product of that disease or defect.
Like Judge Miller in the Blocker dissent,16 Judge Bazelon, in a number
of concurrences and dissents, attacked psychiatrists' investigations, which
he found sketchy and inadequate;87 psychiatrists' medical examinations,
which he found to be cursory;8 and psychiatrists' testimony, which
he found to be conclusory.8 9
Finally, in Washington v. United States,9° court dissatisfaction with
psychiatric domination exploded. Writing the majority decision, Judge
Bazelon revealed his disenchantment with psychiatric testimony dur-
ing the thirteen years since his own optimistic prediction that under
the Durham rule psychiatrists would give the full picture of the de-
fendant's mental state and would then provide to the jury "all infor-
mation advanced by relevant scientific disciplines."9' The Washington
court cited psychiatrists' "persistent use of labels" and "the paucity
of meaningful information presented to the jury."' 92 The medical labels
not only failed to inform the jury, they actually distracted jury atten-
tion from evidence about the defendant's underlying mental and emo-
tional difficulties. Furthermore, in freeing psychiatrists to testify about
criminal culpability, the Durham rule in effect freed them to preempt
the jury's responsibility to decide criminal responsibility. Therefore,
the court announced, psychiatrists would henceforth be barred from
testifying as to whether a defendant's act was a "product," a "result,"
or a "cause" of his mental condition, because this determination is
part of the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury.93 Thus the Durham
85. Id.
86. See supra text accompanying note 26.
87. Simpson v. United States, 320 F.2d 803, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
88. Jackson v. United States, 336 F.2d 579, 583 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
89. Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812, 820-21 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
90. 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
91. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
92. 390 F.2d 444, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
93. Id. at 456. Judge Bazelon's disaffection pervades his opinion. He comments that legal
concepts have, in the hands of psychiatrists, become "slogans," hiding facts and representing
only the witness's own conclusions about the defendant's criminal responsibility. One psychiatrist
admitted that at trial he had reversed his opinion that defendant was not criminally responsible
only because the psychiatrist believed that, if acquitted, the defendant would be released from
a mental hospital and "kill again."Id. at 453 n.26.
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rule, in discarding M'Naghten's "obsolete and misleading"9 ' test of
criminal responsibility based on the knowledge of right and wrong and
permitting full disclosure of "scientific knowledge"95 about the defen-
dant's mental state, had created more problems than it had solved.
The ALl Test
Even after the Washington proscription of expert testimony on the
issue of productivity, experts continued to testify in conclusory terms
in dozens of cases. Finally, in United States v. Brawner,96 eighteen
years after Durham, the District of Columbia agreed to abandon the
Durham test of insanity in a unanimous decision. In its decision, the
court took note of proposals by "responsible judges" and others to
abolish the insanity defense, but stated that the concept of free will-
the ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good
and evil-is a universal and persistent concept in law. Thus, those who
lack free will should not be punished.97 Again, the court assumed that
a new rule with the "right" language would make the insanity defense
work.
The facts of Brawner were largely undisputed. After a morning and
afternoon of wine drinking, Brawner went to a party at the home of
three acquaintances. Fights broke out, and in one of them Brawner's
jaw was injured. He then left the party, unclear of speech and bleeding
from the mouth. One witness said that Brawner said he was going to
"get my boys" and that "someone is going to die tonight."9 Half
an hour later, Brawner returned, fired a shot into the ground, and
then fired through a closed hallway door while the party was still in
progress, killing a man at the party inside. He was arrested shortly
after, several blocks away, and the arresting officer testified that
Brawner appeared normal, had no odor of alcohol about him, and
spoke clearly.
On his own motion, Brawner was admitted to Saint Elizabeth's
Hospital for observation. The hospital report stated that he was com-
petent for trial and that he was mentally ill at the time of his criminal
act, but that the act was not caused by the illness. Psychiatrists and
psychologists from the hospital staff testified at Brawner's trial. They
94. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
95. Id. at 874.
96. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The frustration of the Brawner court regarding conclusory
testimony by experts is seen in portions of Judge Leventhal's majority opinion, at 978-79, and
Judge Bazelon's concurrence and dissent at 1011-19.
97. Id. at 985-86.
98. Id. at 975.
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agreed that Brawner was suffering from organic brain pathology and
an explosive personality disorder, although they used various labels
to describe the disorder. The experts also agreed that Brawner's disorder
manifested itself in an inability to deal with provocation, that he
responded explosively and out of proportion to perceived threats. The
experts disagreed, however, on the relationship between Brawner's men-
tal disorder and his act of murder. The two witnesses for the defense
said that the act was a product of his mental disease; the two govern-
ment witnesses said it was not. One of the latter said that the act was
a "more or less legitimate response to a situation in which he had been
severely injured in a fight."' 9 Said the psychiatrist, "I think I would,
too, under the same circumstances, want to get even with somebody
who broke my jaw."' 100
On appeal, counsel for the defense argued for overturning the ver-
dict on two grounds: (1) the trial court improperly permitted an expert
witness to testify about the causal relationship between the defendant's
mental disease and his act of murder; and (2) the prosecutor went
beyond permissible limits in trying to discredit certain psychological
projective tests administered at Saint Elizabeth's Hospital to the
defendant.'0'
The court of appeals held that although neither of appellant's grounds
were sufficient to reverse, the court would reverse and remand so as
to allow appellant to be tried under the new American Law Institute
insanity test rule, which the District of Columbia courts would
henceforth adopt. The majority of federal circuits had already adopted
the ALI rule;'0 2 the District of Columbia incorporated into that rule
its McDonald definition of mental disease or defect.' 3 The ALI test
states that a person is not responsible for a criminal act if at the time
of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substan-
tial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.'
0 4
The test that the District of Columbia court adopted is stated in
99. Id. at 1014.
100. Id.
101. The irritation of the District of Columbia Circuit Court at conclusory testimony was
probably the reason for the description of the psychological tests that had been used to reach
the experts' conclusions. The Rorschach "inkblot" test, in particular, was susceptible to ridicule
by attorneys.
102. All federal courts now use the ALI test. Their unanimity is more apparent than real,
however. As Judge Bazelon pointed out in his concurring and dissenting opinion, uniformity
in vocabulary existed but not in substance. Major differences in the tests used by the federal
courts are hidden behind "uniform language." 471 F.2d at 1021-22.
103. Id. at 983. For the McDonald definition, see supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
104. 471 F.2d at 991.
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section 4.01(1) of the Model Penal Code. The court refused to adopt
section 4.01(2), known as the caveat paragraph: "(2) As used in this
Article, the terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnor-
mality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social
conduct."
This provision is intended to exclude a defense for the psychopath
or sociopath, whose only evidence of mental abnormality is the criminal
activity in which he engages."°s Although other federal courts include
the caveat paragraph, the Brawner decision cites the rationale of Wade
v. United States,'06 that (1) the caveat would be ineffective in excluding
psychopaths and sociopaths from the insanity definition because some
behavior other than criminal activity could always be found to sup-
port the insanity plea; (2) constant recidivists should "be taken off
the streets indefinitely and not merely for a term of years"; and (3)
even if only the overt acts manifesting the defendant's insanity were
criminal acts, there might arise from them a reasonable inference of
mental derangement.'0
7
This reasoning seems internally contradictory: the argument being
in point (1) that the caveat, though desirable, would not work, and
in point (3) that the caveat might not be desirable after all. The court
points out too that the McDonald definition of mental disease already
excludes a "long criminal record" as an excuse for crime, thus pro-
tecting against experts who consider all criminality as evidence of mental
illness.'08
The Brawner court, however, did incorporate the caveat paragraph
as a rule for application by the judge, though not for inclusion in the
jury instruction:
The introduction or proffer of past criminal and anti-social ac-
tions is not admissible as evidence of mental disease unless accom-
panied by expert testimony, supported by a showing of the con-
cordance of a responsible segment of professional opinion, that
the particular characteristics of these actions constitute convincing
evidence of an underlying mental disease that substantially impairs
behavioral controls.0 9
This paragraph, hedged as it is with verbiage, seems to require that
not one expert but a "concordance" of "responsible" experts must
105. The caveat paragraph would presumably have prevented the defendant in Williams from
using the insanity defense. See supra text accompanying notes 63-71.
106. 426 F.2d 64, 73 (9th Cir. 1970).
107. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 994.
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consider the defendant's criminal behavior to be an indication of
madness rather than mere badness. But how many "responsible" ex-
perts constitute a "concordance" and what evidence is "convincing"?
The court does not say. The paragraph is therefore less than useful,
seeming merely to express the skepticism of the legal profession as to
the validity of the opinions of medical experts, whose contradictory
testimony at insanity trials had been well documented.
In his separate opinion,"' Judge Bazelon takes issue with this
paragraph. He wonders what the court would call "convincing evidence"
of the existence of a "broad consensus."
If five psychiatrists are prepared to assert that a particular condi-
tion does tend to impair free will, how many psychiatrists must
be willing to testify that it does not have such an effect before
we can preclude a responsibility defense on the ground that there
is no "broad consensus" that the defendant's condition tends to
impair free will? How many psychiatrists must be convinced that
a particular condition is "medical" in nature before a defendant
will be permitted, within the confines of the "medical model" to
predicate a responsibility defense on such a condition?"'
Judge Bazelon also notes that at no point in its majority opinion did
the court explain why a legal concept (criminal responsibility) should
be marked by medical concepts, "especially when the validity of the
'medical model' is seriously questioned by some eminent psychia-
trists."' 2
Bazelon's opinion seems, in fact, to concur only in his reluctant adop-
tion of the new test, which he roundly criticizes in all respects. As
he correctly points out, the much berated act-as-product problem of
Durham is still present in the ALI test."3 Under Durham, the accused
is not responsible for an unlawful act if it is "the product" of his
mental disease or defect; under the ALI test, he is not responsible if
"as a result" of mental disease or defect he cannot appreciate the
wrongfulness (criminality) of his act. Causality is the essence of both
tests; only the language used to state it differs. Whether the causality
is called "product" or "result," both tests encourage psychiatrists to
testify in conclusory terms, thus preempting the role of the jury to
determine guilt.
110. Id. at 1010.
I11. Id. at 1029 (emphasis in original).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1027. The M'Naghten test hides the causality relationship best because it states
the question as whether the accused "was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of his actions." See McNaghten's Case,
10 Clark & F 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843) (emphasis added).
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[In Brawner] the Court repeats precisely the mistake it correctly
identifies in Durham: the articulation of a catch-phrase that
facilitates conclusory expert testimony and that obscures the moral
and legal overtones of the productivity.question. Where a
psychiatrist would formerly have testified that the act was not the
"product" of the disease, he can now assert that the disease of
the defendant does not entail as a "result" the kind of impair-
ment that could have produced the act in question."4
In fact, because the Brawner court eliminated the Washington pro-
hibition of expert testimony relating to the issue of productivity, " Judge
Bazelon predicted that the net effect would be to permit experts once
again to "tell the jury in conclusory terms that the act was not caused
by the defendant's impairment"'1 6 and make it easier for experts to
continue domination of the decision-making process."7
Because of his concern that the proposed ALI test would allow ex-
perts to continue to encroach upon the task of the jury to determine
guilt, Judge Bazelon proposed that juries be instructed to find a defen-
dant not guilty if he was not "justly responsible" for his criminal act."
The instruction would state that "a defendant is not responsible if at
the time of his unlawful conduct his mental or emotional processes
or behavior controls were impaired to such an extent that he cannot
justly be held responsible for his act.'"I 9 Such an instruction would,
Judge Bazelon believed, enable the jury to clarify the crucial question
of responsibility, while still utilizing expert testimony to evaluate the
defendant's impairment and decide whether that impairment made it
unjust to hold the defendant responsible for his crime.2 ' The ALI test,
on the other hand, merely rewords and obfuscates the Durham test
by using "unfamiliar" and "incomprehensible concepts" like "the
capacity to appreciate wrongfulness" and "the capacity to conform
conduct"-concepts that do little to aid jurors to do their duty.
12'
Judge Bazelon's "responsibility" test had already been proposed by
114. 471 F.2d at 1027. The Brawner case itself exemplifies the causality problem. Experts on
both sides agreed that the accused was mentally ill; they disagreed, however, on whether his
crime was causally related to his mental illness. Id. at 975. See supra text accompanying notes
98-100.
115. Id. at 1003.
116. Id. at 1027.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1030.
119. Id. at 1032 (emphasis in original).
120. Id. at 1030. In fact, the ALI test would be obviated, rather than clarified, by Judge
Bazelon's test, which focused on whether the defendant's act is blameworthy by community stand-
ards. The ALl test focuses instead on whether the defendant's act is related to his mental impair-
ment. Id. at 1031.
121. Id. at 1031.
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a minority of the ALI draftsmen. Had it been adopted, it would have
provided that a person
[would not] be responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect his capacity
either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law is so substantially impaired
that he cannot justly be held responsible.2 2
The majority of ALI draftsmen rejected this language on the grounds
that an instruction "overtly cast in terms of justice" would add ex-
traneous information and would set the jury adrift without "crystallized
rules," thus permitting it to convict without regard to legal standards.'
23
As Judge Bazelon points out, however, the minority instruction pro-
vides clearer guidelines than the rule actually adopted because it clarifies
the otherwise vague concept of substantiality.'
24
Judge Bazelon's prediction that under the ALI test experts would
continue to dominate decision making proved correct. In one 1978 case, the
defendant appealed his conviction of voluntary manslaughter partly
on the ground that the testifying psychiatrists' use of medical labels
so confused the jury that it could not properly decide whether the defen-
dant suffered from a mental disease. 121 In another case, a defendant
was found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) after he succeeded
in duping psychiatrists, who then testified in his defense.'2 6 On being
committed to Saint Elizabeth's Hospital, he announced that he had
made up the stories he told the psychiatrists. The court had no recourse
but to release him unconditionally from Saint Elizabeth's, but it com-
plained that "Doctors are obliged to reach conclusions on unconfirmed
theories and facts largely obtained from the offender who can withhold
or concoct data at will.'1 2 7 The court added that although the present
122. Id. at 1033. But the language of the ALI minority test retained the vague concepts (con-
formance of conduct and substantiality) that Judge Bazelon found unacceptable in the majority
ALI test adopted in Brawner.
123. Id. There is a semantic problem with the word "responsible" in both Judge Bazelon's
and the ALI minority's proposed instruction, however. "Responsible" can mean either "able
to discharge one's obligations," or "accountable for one's actions." In both instructions, the
first "responsible" has the first meaning, the second "responsible" has the second meaning.
Such a meaning shift could well cause a problem for juries.
124. Id.
125. Government of Virgin Islands v. Fredericks, 578 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1978).
126. United States v. Carter, 415 F. Supp. 15 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The psychiatrists' diagnosis
was based partly on the defendant's statement that he had previously raped three hundred women,
an admission he knew would create an impression of sexual problems and promote his insanity
claim.
127. Id. at 16. The judge said: "Obviously the appropriate thing to do would be to set aside
the not guilty finding and prosecute for the underlying offense. It is apparent, however, that
the finding of not guilty by reason of insanity cannot be reopened or re-examined."
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state of psychiatric knowledge is "volatile and inexact" and "examin-
ing experts frequently disagree," judges must rely upon the advice of
these experts.
2
The ALI test also creates other problems not found in Durham. There
is the confusion of the concept of substantiality. The word itself oc-
curs only once, but it is implied twice, a person being not responsible
for his criminal act if he lacks "substantial capacity either to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or [lacks substantial capacity] to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of law." What is meant by
"substantial" is not stated.'29 As to the capacity to "appreciate" that
one's conduct is criminal, critics maintain that no objectively verifiable
tests are available to ascertain whether a person "appreciated" that
his act was wrong; you can only take his word on the matter.'30
The "capacity to conform" concept is equally nebulous. Psychiatrists
point out that no objective test has been devised to establish one's
ability to conform his conduct to law.
But if I assert that I have an uncontrollable impulse to break shop
windows . . . no proof of uncontrollability can be adduced. All
that is known is that the impulse was not in fact controlled, and
it is perfectly legitimate to hold the opinion that, had I tried a
little harder, I might have conquered it.'
3'
In a vigorous attack on this concept, one psychiatrist 'asserts that no
man can answer the question of whether any other individual possessed
either the capacity to appreciate that his conduct is wrong, or the ability
to conform his conduct to legal requirements.'
3 2
The ALI definition is also circular. Although the law presumes that
some individuals are incapable of conforming their conduct to its re-
quirements, the only proof of an individual's inability to do so may
be his nonconforming conduct. Yet psychiatrists have testified that such
a condition existed based upon as little evidence as the single act for
which the defendant was being tried.
33
128. Id.
129. The only explanation provided is that if capacity is greatly impaired, that is sufficient
for the purposes of the test. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 4.01, comment at 159 (rent. Draft No. 4 1955).
130. See, e.g., Wooton, Book Review, .77 YALE L.J. 1019, 1026 (1968) (reviewing A. GOLD-
sTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE).
131. Id.
132. Dr. Kurt Schneider, Zum Problem der Neufassung des § 51, in E. SEELIG, FESTSCHRIFT
FUR EDMUND MEZER (1954), cited by H. SrLVING, ESSAYS ON MENTAL INCAPACrY AND CRIMINAL
CONDUCT 104-05 (1967).
133. BRITISH HOME OFFICE, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND SOC. SEC., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON MENTALLY ABNORMAL OFENDRms 218 (1975), cited in Case Comment, People v. Drew-Will
California's New Insanity Test Ensure a More Accurate Determination of Insanity?, 17 SAN
DmcO L. REv. 491, 505 (1980).
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In his Brawner brief, amicus curiae William H. Dempsey, Jr. sug-
gests that in the jury instructions, "considerable" ought to be substituted
for "substantial."'34 But the difference in meaning between these two
words, though apparently clear to Dempsey, is not apparent to lex-
icographers or to most other people.'" In another example of hair-
splitting, Dempsey suggests the term "mental abnormality" instead of
"mental defect," because he believes that the former would focus at-
tention upon the degree of impairment instead of upon the clinical
categories of mental illness.13 6
As for the terms "mental disease or defect," which appear in both
the Durham and the ALI test, psychiatrists argue that both are mean-
ingless because they denote theory, not medical fact.'" One psychologist
has called "mental disease" a "big umbrella" under whose protection
are gathered
people with organic problems and people with non-organic prob-
lems, people with perceptual difficulties and people with behavioral
difficulties; people whose brains have been damaged and people
who ... have never learned how to get along in life. Those who
are criminal or guilty or lazy have found escape beneath the um-
brella together with those who are senile and those who have glan-
dular problems. This is truly a most motley mob.'38
Medically, the concept of mental illness is an anomaly. "Illness"
implies deviation from a well-defined norm. In physical illness the norm
is the structural and functional integrity of the body, statable in
anatomical or physiological terms.'39 No such norm has been established
with which to compare mental illness. So "mental illness" is often a
term to describe problems in living. 4 Thus, when a psychiatrist testifies
that an accused is mentally ill, he is really announcing his conclusion
that, according to his own value system, the behavior of the accused
is improper. ' ' Furthermore, when a defendant pleads "mental disease
or defect" at his trial, his deviation from the norm must be stated
134. Amicus Curiae Brief, United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
135. The American Heritage Dictionary, for example, defines "substantial" as "considerable
in importance, value, degree, amount or extent," and "considerable" as "worthy of considera-
tion, important, significant."
136. Amicus Curiae Brief, Brawner.
137. SzAsz, supra.note 47, at 133. Thus it is a perversion of our language and thought to
require a jury to decide "as a matter of fact" if the defendant has a mental disease.
138. J. ADAm, THE BIG UMBRELL.A 3 (1972), cited in Watkins, Guilty But Mentally 111: A
Reasonable Compromise for Pennsylvania, 85 DICKINsoN L. REv. 289, 291 (1981).
139. SZASz, supra note 47, at 14.
140. Id. at 13.
141. Id.
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in "psychosocial, ethical and legal concepts,"'' 42 although psychiatrists
think in terms of medical remedies, which place on human conduct
no ethical evaluation. "The definition of the disorder and the terms
in which its remedy is sought are therefore at odds with one another.
The practical significance of this covert conflict . .. can hardly be
exaggerated.'"
43
Jury Response to Expert Testimony in Insanity Trials
Perhaps Judge Bazelon's most damning criticism in his Brawner con-
currence and dissent was his "best hope" that juries would ignore the
instruction on insanity, concluding that not even experts could pro-
vide meaningful answers to the "unfamiliar if not incomprehensible
concepts" of the ALl test.'
4 4
Judge Bazelon's "best hope" has sometimes been realized. In United
States v. Dube,'45 the jury declined to be swayed by the testimony of
a psychiatrist and a psychologist that the defendant was insane when
he committed his crime. The appeals court held that the diagnosis of
the experts was based on "minimal observations" and was therefore
suspect and that in any event, "expert testimony is not conclusive even
where uncontradicted; its weight and credibility are for the jury to
determine."""'
In Burks v. United States,147 the defendant pleaded insanity and pro-
duced three expert witnesses, who (though presenting different diagnoses
of his mental condition) agreed that he suffered from a mental illness,
rendering him substantially incapable of conforming his conduct to
the law at the time of the crime. The government experts disagreed
about whether the accused was mentally ill, one saying he was, the
other saying that he had a "character disorder."'48 Lay witnesses, on
the other hand, testified that the defendant appeared to be sane when
he committed the crime. The jury found him guilty as charged.'
49
142. Id. at 14.
143. Id.
144. 471 F.2d 969, 975, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
145. 520 F.2d 250 (1st Cir. 1975).
146. Id. at 252.
147. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
148. Id. at 3.
149. Id. In an ironic twist, the court of appeals agreed with petitioner, who had appealed
on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, and reversed. 547 F.2d
968 (6th Cir. 1976). The court of appeals remanded to the district court to determine whether
a directed verdict of acquittal should be entered or a new trial ordered. The petitioner appealed
to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that the appellate court's reversal was the equivalent
of a judgment of acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause precluded
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And in United States v. Gitfiss,' °5 all three expert witnesses agreed
that the defendant was a pathological gambler and that this condition
was an "impulse disorder." (They disagreed, however, about whether
pathological gambling was a "mental disease or defect" as used in
the ALI rule.) The jury found the defendant sane, and the appellate
court confirmed this verdict, holding that "the government produced
sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find that appellant was sane
beyond a reasonable doubt and that therefore, the submission of the
insanity question to the jury was proper.
' '215
Juries sometimes choose to reject psychiatric testimony as to a defen-
dant's insanity even under the M'Naghten test, which provides a simpler
(right/wrong) standard to determine responsibility for criminal con-
duct and is therefore presumably easier to understand. In Holloway
v. United States,'52 despite the testimony of the three psychiatrists that
the defendant was of unsound mind and did not know right from wrong
at the time of the double rape for which he was being tried, the jury
found him guilty as charged. The appellate court, upholding the ver-
dict, said that the jury judgment "sfiould not be disturbed on the ground
it is contrary to expert psychiatric opinion."'' 5
And in a Pennsylvania case,' 4 a defendant who had killed his
chronically ill adopted daughter relied upon the defense of insanity.
The defense introduced the testimony of three expert witnesses, who
had examined the accused on dates two months, three months, and
six months after the murder. All testified that at the time of the crime
he had not known right from wrong. In rebuttal, the prosecution called
lay witnesses who had observed the defendant within a short period
after the crime and who testified that he seemed calm and rational.
The jury rejected the insanity defense and found the defendant criminally
responsible. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that it
was the jury's prerogative to refuse credence to psychiatric opinion
as to whether the defendant was legally insane.
Finally, in People v. Drew,'5 in which the California Supreme Court
abandoned the M'Naghten test and adopted the ALl test for deter-
mining insanity in criminal trials, the defendant violently resisted the
efforts of police officers to eject him from a bar where he had started
a second trial once the reviewing court found the evidence legally insufficient. Thus the defen-
dant, although having admitted his guilt, was acquitted. 437 U.S. at 17-18.
150. 645 F.2d 1269 (8th Cir. 1981).
151. Id. at 1277.
152. 148 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
153. Id. at 667.
154. Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d 98 (1960).
155. 22 Cal. 3d 333, 583 P.2d 1318, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978).
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a fight. Despite the testimony of court-appointed psychiatrists that the
defendant was unable to appreciate the difference between right and
wrong, the jury found him guilty. Although the defendant did not at-
tack the trial court's jury instruction in his appellate brief, the California
Supreme Court jettisoned the M'Naghten test and remanded the case
for retrial under the ALI rule.
There may be reasons other than confusion about the meaning of
jury instructions for jury rejection of expert testimony in these and
other insanity trials. Juries may tend to discredit psychiatric and
psychological testimony per se,'56 or, where expert testimony conflicts,
the jury may choose to ignore experts on both sides.' Finally, juries
may consider the determination of guilt to be their prerogative and
resist the usurpation of that privilege by expert witnesses who use a
plethora of psychiatric labels and report in conclusory terms."'
Studies also indicate that jurors are unable to distinguish between
the M'Naghten and the Durham instructions,"9 and these findings would
no doubt apply also to the ALI test, which is closer to M'Naghten
than to Durham. In the same study, various juries were given the follow-
ing formula: "If you believe the defendant was insane at the time he
committed the act of which he is accused, then you must find the defend-
ant not guilty by reason of insanity." When the same juries were asked
to distinguish among the M'Naghten, the Durham, and this simple in-
struction, they failed to see any significant difference,'60 leading to the
conclusion that juries function just as well without formal instruction
as to criminal responsibility as with it.' 61
Public Fears About the Insanity Plea
In recent years the public's fear about its safety from insanity ac-
quittees has greatly increased. Until the 1970s a defendant found not
156. Dr. Abraham Halpern, a psychiatrist who believes that the insanity defense should be
abandoned, argues that the defense is confusing to the public, to the courts, to lawyers and
to psychiatrists; that it subjects the legal and psychiatric professions to ridicule and contempt,
and that it has undermined respect for law on the part of the public. Interview on the MacNeil-
Lehrer Report, WNET TV, Sept. 28, 1981.
157. Professor David Robinson of George Washington University notes that in every major
jurisdiction there are some psychiatrists known as defense psychiatrists and others known as
prosecution psychiatrists, who can be relied upon to testify on either side of the insanity ques-
tion. MacNeil-Lehrer Report, supra note 156.
158. R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 177 (1967).
159. Id. at 199. Judge Bazelon's suggested "justly responsible" instruction (see text at note
118 supra) would also presumably be perceived as similar to the M'Naghten, Durham, and ALl
instructions.
160. Id. at 200.
161. Id.
19831
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) was usually placed indefinitely into
a state mental hospital for the criminally insane and the public could
safely forget about him. But following the development of psychotropic
medications in the 1950s and the class action suits of the 1960s and
1970s, the public could no longer be certain that these defendants would
be stashed away securely in mental hospitals.'62 Psychotropic medica-
tions reduce patients' symptoms, and their use has resulted in the
emptying of state institutions by greatly reducing the average length
of stay.'63 Even before coming to trial, a defendant committed to a
state institution might, as a result of medication, be functioning well,
though alleged to have been insane at the time he committed his crime.
Furthermore, the defendant who successfully pleads insanity is no
longer automatically committed to a mental hospital.'64 In most states,
a court hearing must be held employing the same standard for criminally
insane commitment as for civil commitment.'5 The person subject to
hospitalization in these states must not only be currently mentally ill
but, as a result of that illness, be dangerous to himself or others in
the near future. When the defendant's symptoms are in remission or
controlled by medication, the court is at an impasse in determining
dangerousness.'6 The burden is even greater in the eleven states that
require that homicidal or suicidal dangerousness be manifested by a
recent overt act.'67 The NGRI defendant who has been institutionalized
while awaiting trial is unlikely to have "acted out" any such danger-
ousness, and the civil commitment hearing evidence rules probably bar
a description of his criminal conduct because it was too removed from
the hearing.'68 In the thirteen states in which dangerousness must be
162. Weiner, The Sane Approach to Protecting the Public from the Person Found Not Guilty
by Reason of Insanity, 62 Cm. B. REc. 196, 197 (1981). Current psychiatric opinion is that
placing mentally ill patients into "secure" facilities may be counterproductive to their mental
well-being. For example, the New York public became alarmed by the statement of a psychiatrist
for the Mental Hygiene Department that his hospital would not install fences or other security
devices around its facility, as a matter of "philosophy." N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1980, § 2, at
2, col. 1. New York subsequently passed the Insanity Defense Reform Act. See infra text at
notes 189-192.
163. Weiner, supra note 17, at 1065. In Illinois the average length of stay for a mentally ill
person in a state hospital in 1955 was ten years and eight months; in 1979, it was twenty-two
days. A recent study reported that persons found NGRI were spending an average of 533 days
in mental institutions, compared with 837 days in prison for persons convicted of comparable
crimes. Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, Oct. 21, 1981 at 8A.
164. Weiner, supra note 17, at 1085 app. B. Commitment is automatic in only twenty states,
in one of which (Georgia) it is only for thirty days.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1068.
167. Id. at 1070.
168. Id. at 1068.
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proved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt in order to meet the
civil commitment standard, it is even more difficult to force involun-
tary commitment for NGRI individuals.'69
If the NGRI individual does not meet the standards for civil com-
mitment, the court in twenty-five states has no option but to discharge
him from custody.70 If the court does succeed in having him commit-
ted, in many states he is no longer under the court's jurisdiction. His
criminal record will not follow him to the hospital, and the treatment
staff may not be aware of his crime and will thus have an incomplete
picture of the patient's personality." ' Once stabilized, the individual
might well be discharged as cured by the hospital staff with no review
by the court and no requirement of follow-up care.' In twenty-one
states the criminal court does not review the discharge of the NGRI
individual, so no one is safeguarding the interests of the public. 
7
1
Fears about public safety have increased also because of court deci-
sions that equal protection principles require that NGRI persons com-
mitted to mental institutions be accorded the same rights as civilly com-
mitted individuals.'" In Baxstrom v. Herold,'75 the Supreme Court
held that proven criminal conduct does not justify different standards
and procedures at the commitment stage. In Jackson v. Indiana,76
the Court extended Baxstrom, holding that the mere filing of criminal
charges does not justify less procedural and substantive protection to
the individual concerned than is provided in civil cases. The Court noted
approvingly that case law had extended the Baxstrom principle to in-
clude commitment following an insanity acquittal, so that release stand-
ards for NGRI individuals would not differ from standards applied
to other mental patients.'77
The well-publicized case of In re Torsney'78 further aroused New
169. Id. at 1068-69.
170. Id. at 1069 n.85. This is true in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maryland, Illinois, Indiana, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas,
Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
171. Id. at 1070 n.91. Attorney Weiner, then counsel for the Illinois Department of Mental
Health, reports that a hospital therapist told her that she "knew" that a person who had been
found NGRI of murder a week before had not committed any crime, because the person had
told her he had not.
172. Id., app. B.
173. Id.
174. 21 AM. Jua. 2d Criminal Law § 90 (1981).
175. 383 U.S.. 107, 110 (1966).
176. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
177. Id. at 724. Cases cited were Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Cameron
v. Mullen, 387 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1967); People v. Lally, 19 N.Y.2d 27, 234 N.E.2d 87 (1966).
178. 47 N.Y.2d 667, 394 N.E.2d 262 (1979).
1983]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1983
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
Yorkers' fears for their safety. Torsney, a New York City policeman,
shot and killed a 15-year-old black youth, with no apparent motive.
Tried for second degree murder, he pleaded NGRI. At Torsney's trial,
a defense psychiatrist testified that at the time of his crime, because
of a mental defect, Torsney did not know or appreciate the wrongfulness
of his act. A defense psychologist testified that Torsney's conduct was
"consonant with the anxiety and bewilderment" expected in "an epilep-
tic equivalent." " 9 A psychiatrist and a psychologist for the prosecu-
tion testified, on the contrary, that Torsney was not psychotic and was
therefore criminally responsible for his act. 80
Only a week after Torsney's acquittal, two psychiatrists at the state
mental hospital examined him and found him to be of normal reason-
ing and judgment and without mental illness or defect. Neither doctor
believed that he was in need of hospitalization or confinement. Other
psychiatrists who examined Torsney in the several months that followed
during his confinement agreed that he showed no signs of mental
disorder. ' 8' A special release committee, convened only six months after
his acquittal on grounds of insanity, unanimously agreed that Torsney
was "not suffering from a psychosis, psychopathic disorder or organic
damage, and that he was not dangerous to himself or others and should
be released."'82 After a hearing at which some eighteen witnesses agreed
with the release committee, Torsney was granted a conditional release.' I
On appeal by the district attorney, the appellate division reversed and
ordered that Torsney be recommitted. The court of appeals reversed
the appellate court and, in a plurality decision, reinstated Torsney's
conditional release,'84 on the ground that a person acquitted of a crime
by reason of insanity must be released from state custody unless deter-
mined to be dangerous as a result of mental disease or defect.8 '
In his dissent, Judge Wachtler argued that releasing "a dangerous
detainee" if he does not suffer from a mental disease or defect that
"fits into a psychiatric category and has a particular psychiatric label"
may constitute a substantial risk to the public.86 Torsney's mental con-
179. Id., 394 N.E.2d at 267-68.
180. Id.
181. Id., 394 N.E.2d at 268.
182. Id., 394 N.E.2d at 269.
183. Id.
184. The decision was four to three, with Judge Wachtler writing a strong dissent. In his
opinion the hearing testimony overwhelmingly demonstrated that Torsney "has remained as volatile
and explosive as he was on the date of the killing." Id., 394 N.E.2d at 277.
185. Dangerousness alone is not sufficient to justify commitment of NGRI individuals. It must
be causally related to mental disease or defect. Otherwise commitment amounts to preventive
detention. Id., 394 N.E.2d at 271.
186. Id., 394 N.E.2d at 275.
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dition, labeled a personality disorder, is not usually classified by
psychiatrists as mental illness. Therefore a person found legally NGRI
might be considered medically sane by the medical staff at the institu-
tion to which he is committed. Judge Wachtler argued that because
the primary concern is protection of the public, "it would be a frightful
paradox to release such a person ... because his mental defect could
not be labeled in psychiatric terms." The plurality holding "exalts this
paradox to law.""'7 Judge Wachtler disagreed also with the plurality's
position that institutionalization of persons acquitted of a violent crime
by reason of a mental defect must be discontinued if the mental defect
is untreatable.'"8
Judge Wachtler's dissent reflected public response to the Torsney
decision. The public perception of the decision was that compliance
with constitutional requirements to treating insanity acquittees like civilly
committed mental patients jeopardized the public's safety.'89 As a direct
result of the decision, the New York legislature passed the Insanity
Defense Reform Act of 1980,190 which, inter alia, provided that the
district attorney be notified of all hearings on the transfer, furlough,
and release of persons committed as a result of a successful NGRI
plea.'9 ' The change was intended to provide an advocate to safeguard
the public interest in the confinement of dangerous persons.'9 The
district attorney would also provide a viewpoint at these hearings other
than that of the Department of Mental Hygiene psychiatrists, whose
decision about releasability of mental patients, being based wholly upon
medical definitions, might vary not only from time to time but from
psychiatrist to psychiatrist.'93
Although participation of the district attorney in these matters may
accomplish the purpose of balancing the interest of the public with
that of the insanity acquittee, such participation may constitute a pro-
cedural difference between the treatment accorded NGRI and other
187. Id.
188. Id., 394 N.E.2d at 276.
189. The acquittal of the defendant created a strong movement in the press to reevaluate the
insanity defense. For a discussion, see Comment, Reforming Insanity Defense Procedures in
New York: Balancing Societal Protection Against Individual Liberty, 45 ALB. L. R1v. 679, 691-96
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
190. Act of June 26, 1980, 1980 N.Y. Laws ch. 548. The New York Mental Hygiene Depart-
ment, under whose supervision insanity acquittees were placed, suggested that the insanity defense
be eliminated, not revised. Report of the Law Revision Commission on the Defense of Insanity
in New York State, n.2 (1980).
191. N.Y. CUM. PROC. LAW §§ 330.20(10), (11), (12) (McKinney 1980).
192. Comment, supra note 189, at 699.
193. Id. For a discussion of two contradictory psychiatric schools, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 52-56.
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mental patients and thus be held to infringe upon the equal protection
and due process rights of insanity acquittees.'9' Furthermore, even if
constitutional, the involvement of the district attorney may not pre-
vent the release of NGRI patients who would otherwise be freed. Despite
the appearance and vigorous argument of the district attorney opposing
the release of Torsney, the court nevertheless approved his release,
depending heavily on psychiatric testimony in makilg its decision.9 5
The Guilty But Mentally I1l Alternative
As in New York, a court decision in Michigan exacerbated public
fears and resulted in legislation to protect the citizenry from perceived
dangerous acts by released NGRI defendants. The Michigan Supreme
Court, in People v. McQuillan,96 held that due process and equal pro-
tection rights of such defendants were equal to those of mental pa-
tients civilly committed. Citing Baxstrom and Jackson, among other
cases,'97 the court stated that because an acquittal by reason of insani-
ty establishes only that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the defendant's mental competence at the time he
committed the crime-which may have been months before-the
presumption of insanity is invalid.'98 The court therefore construed
Michigan's automatic commitment statute to require a hearing to deter-
mine the NGRI defendant's current mental condition before commit-
ting him to a mental institution.'99
As a result of the McQuillan verdict, sixty-four inmates, who were
found to be "presently" sane were released from state hospitals.20'
Within a short time two of them had committed other violent crimes.
The public furor that followed resulted in the passage of the Michigan
GBMI statute.
20 1
The new verdict provides the court with one more option. A criminal
defendant in Michigan may now be found guilty, not guilty, NGRI,
or guilty but mentally ill. Once a defendant raises an insanity defense,
a GBMI verdict results in his receiving a sentence equal to that which
194. Comment, supra note 189, at 715.
195. Id. at 709.
196. 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569, 574-84 (1974).
197. Id.
198. Id., 221 N.W.2d at 578.
199. Id.
200. MICH. HousE LEO. ANALYSIS SEMCON, THIRD ANALYSIS OF MICH. H.B. 4363, 18th Leg.
(July 15, 1975); Note, Guilty But Mentally 111: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 53
J. URB. L. 471, 483 (1976).
201. MICH. Comp. LAws § 768.36 (1982). Michigan's GBMI "statute" is actually a series of
amendments and additions to existing Michigan laws. Indiana and Illinois have also adopted
GBMI statutes like Michigan's.
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would be imposed if he were sane, the degree of criminal culpability
being the same for a defendant found GBMI as for a defendant found
guilty. 01 But the GBMI defendant is committed to the custody of the
Corrections Department or the Department of Mental Health for the
psychiatric treatment indicated for his mental illness or retardation.3
Other restrictions are imposed upon the GBMI defendant. If he is
discharged from the facility to which he has been admitted for
psychiatric treatment before the expiration of the sentence imposed
for his crime, the facility must file a report with the parole board ex-
plaining the person's condition, the course of treatment, the potential
for remission or recidivism, and the danger to himself or to the public. 04
If he is being considered for parole, his continuing treatment may be
made a condition.05 Continued treatment may also be a condition of
probation, with failure to get it a violation of parole.2 0 6 In addition,
the GBMI who is placed on parole must be given a minimum term
of five years, subject to reduction upon court consideration of a forensic
psychiatric report on his condition. 7
A defendant found NGRI, on the other hand, is committed to the
Center for Forensic Psychiatry for no longer than sixty days, during
which his current mental condition is evaluated.208 The Center then
reports to the court whether the defendant meets the criteria for civil
commitment; a judicial hearing is held, and the defendant is either
committed or discharged.
2 0 9
A defendant may be found GBMI if the trier of fact determines
beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of an offense and was
mentally ill but not legally insane when he committed the offense.210
Definition of the terms "mental illness" and "legal insanity" is pro-
vided by Michigan statute. A person is mentally ill if he suffers from
"a substantial disorder of thought or mood which significantly im-
pairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to
cope with the ordinary demands of life.'"21 A person is legally insane
"if, as a result of [statutorily defined] mental illness, or as a result
of [statutorily defined] mental retardation, that person lacks substan-
202. Id. § 768.36(3) (1982).
203. Id. If the defendant is discharged from the Department of Mental Health, he serves out
his sentence after being returned to the Department of Corrections.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. § 330.2050.
209. Id. §§ 330.1401, .1515.
210. Id. § 768.36(1)(a)(b)(c). This is the way the Hinckley jurors viewed the defendant. See
infra text accompanying note 283.
211. Id. § 330.1400a.
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tial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." '
The GBMI plea may avoid the dilemma of a jury that must other-
wise either decide that a defendant is guilty as charged or "innocent"
of responsibility for a crime he admits. The GBMI verdict permits a
middle ground, in which the jury can hold the defendant responsible
for his crime and still provide the mental health treatment that may
prevent him from committing future crimes.2" 3 The new plea also pro-
vides a compromise between those who call for abolition of the insanity
defense altogether and proponents of the insanity defense. For the
former, it provides a step toward abolishing the defense and avoids
possible constitutional prohibitions that may block that objective.
Critics of GBMI argue, however, that the verdict may be overutilized.
Because the statutory definitions of "mental illness" and "legal in-
sanity" in the Michigan law overlap, the consequent confusion will
cause jurors to find some legally insane defendants GBMI.2 " "Conse-
quently, the GBMI statute will deprive these legally insane defendants
not only of their statutory rights but also of their colorable constitu-
tional right to acquittal.
215
The greatest source of confusion in the Michigan law lies, however,
not in the overlapping of its definitions but in its semantic distinc-
tions. "Mental illness" and "insanity" are defined as two different
sets of mind, so that the comparison is as between apples and oranges.
The definition of "mental illness" describes a state of mind ("a substan-
tial disorder of thought or mood");216 the definition of "insanity"
describes behavior resulting from that state of mind: "as a result of
mental illness, the person [cannot] conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of the law." '21 7 The language, "lacks substantial capacity
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct,"2 8 (part of the insanity
212. Id. § 768.21a. This is virtually the language used in the A.L.I. MODEL PENAL CODE §
4.01(l). "Mental retardation" is defined as "significantly subaverage general intellectual func-
tioning.., associated with impairment in adaptive behavior." MICH. Comp. LAWS § 330.1500g
(1982).
213. Studies suggest that jurors would find the GBMI verdict exactly the kind of middle ground
they would prefer, so that they could distinguish the mentally ill defendant from the ordinary
guilty criminal, while ensuring condemnation of his crime. SIMON, supra note 158, at 172, and
infra text accompanying note 288.
214. Comment, The Constitutionality of Michigan's Guilty But Mentally ill Verdict, 12 U.
MICH. J. L. REF. 188, 195-96 (1978).
215. Id. at 199. On the other hand, given the tendency of juries to assess with skepticism
the expert opinions they hear, the GBMI verdict may result in some defendants who would be
found guilty under the NGRI defense alone receiving the GBMI verdict.
216. MICH. Comp. LAWS § 768.36 (1982).
217. Id.
218. Id.
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definition) hardly differs from the definition of mental illness: "a
substantial disorder... which significantly impairs judgment, behavior,
capacity to recognize reality, or the ability to cope with the ordinary
demands of life."
Since frequently the strongest evidence of the inability of the NGRI
defendant "to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law"
is his criminal conduct, the trier of fact would presumably be barred
from finding the defendant GBMI because the criminal behavior for
which he was being tried would require that he be statutorily defined
as insane.21 9 On the other hand, the choice of the GBMI or the NGRI
verdicts submits to the jury the issue of the degree of mental impair-
ment of the defendant. Given the choice, the jury may well make its
decision instead on the basis of whether the defendant should be held
responsible for his criminal conduct.
221
Critics also charge that the GBMI verdict is unconstitutional. In Peo-
ple v. McLeod,22' the trial judge, sua sponte, made the point that eighth
amendment rights of GBMI persons were being violated because the
mental treatment mandated by the statute was not available.222 Although
the Michigan statute provides that the defendant be treated for his men-
tal illness or retardation, the court held that such care was impossible
within the Department of Corrections and that conditions therein would
pose the threat of harm to the defendant. The trial judge therefore
set aside McLeod's conviction and declared it a nullity. 223 The Michigan
Court of Appeals reversed, however, stating that the reasoning of the
trial court was premature, being based upon speculation that the man-
date of the GBMI statute would not be heeded by the Department
of Corrections.224 In other decisions, the appeals court stated that the
appropriate remedy when the Department of Corrections failed to meet
219. If this is the case, included as "insane" will be those same psychopaths (sociopaths),
who are specifically excluded in § 4.01(2) of the A.L.I. MODEL PENAL CODE. See supra text
accompanying note 105.
220. This problem has not seemed to prevent Michigan juries from arriving at verdicts of
GBMI. See, e.g., People v. Long, 86 Mich. App. 676, 273 N.W.2d 519 (1978); People v. Booth,
86 Mich. App. 646, 273 N.W.2d 510 (1978); People v. Mikulin, 84 Mich. App. 705, 270 N.W.2d
500 (1978); People v. Darwall, 82 Mich. App. 652, 267 N.W.2d 472 (1978). For the recommen-
dation that the jury charge should be on "responsibility," see supra text at notes 118-120.
221. No. 7601672 (Recorder's Court, Detroit, Mich., Sept. 21, 1976) (slip op.). For a discus-
sion of this case, see Comment, Guilty But Mentally 11l A Reasonable Compromise for Penn-
sylvania, 85 DiCKINSON L. REv. 289, 312-13 (1981).
222. MIcH. CoMP. LAWS § 768.36(3) (1982).
223. People v. McLeod, No. 7601672, slip op. at 18 (Recorder's Court, Detroit, Mich., Sept.
21, 1976)
224. People v. McLeod, 77 Mich. App. 327, 258 N.W.2d 214 (1977), aff'd, 407 Mich. 632,
288 N.W.2d 909 (1980).
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its obligations would be a complaint for a writ of mandamus to en-
force the Department's duty under the statute.
2
11
The trial court in McLeod also raised the issue of whether the provi-
sion of the GBMI statute that GBMI defendants be placed on proba-
tion for five years violated their right to equal protection because no
such provision was stipulated for other defendants found guilty of
similar crimes.226 The court of appeals found, however, and the supreme
court affirmed, (1) that the provision infringed upon no fundamental
right; (2) that GBMI persons were not members of a suspect class;
and (3) that the provision furthered the object of the legislation, the
assurance of supervised mental health care for GBMI defendants.227
Assuming that the optional GBMI verdict will result in the finding
'of some persons to be guilty but mentally ill who, without the ver-
dict's option, would be found not guilty because insane, the question
also arises whether an insanity defense is constitutionally mandated.
In three early cases, 8 statutes abolishing the insanity defense were
held unconstitutional because they violated defendants' due process
rights because intent is a required element of a mens rea crime and
an insane person cannot form the requisite intent. Because insanity
as a defense has historically been basic to American criminal law,2 9
the insanity defense is arguably protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment. However, the GBMI verdict does not deprive the defendant of
the NGRI verdict, and thus the argument can be made that the defen-
dant's due process right is not violated by the addition of the GBMI
verdict.20 Furthermore, because the GBMI verdict is available only
to persons mentally ill but not insane, and mentally ill persons can
presumably possess mens rea, the GBMI verdict may be held consti-
tutional.3
225. People v. Tenbrink, 93 Mich. App. 326, 287 N.W.2d 223, 225 (1979); People v. Sorna,
88 Mich. App. 351, 276 N.W.2d 892, 897 (1979).
226. People v. McLeod, No. 7601672 (Recorder's Court, Detroit, Mich., Sept. 21, 1976) (slip
op.).
227. 407 Mich. 632, 288 N.W.2d 909, 918-19 (1980). The five-year probation was also re-
ducible, upon court consideration of a forensic psychiatric review of the defendant's condition.
See supra text accompanying notes 202-207.
228. State v. Lange, 168 La. 957, 123 So. 639 (1929); Sinclair v. State, 162 Miss. 142, 132
So. 581 (1931) (per curiam); State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910).
229. W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, CRnnNAL LAW, § 28 (1972).
230. In Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 484 (1895), for example, the Court, in con-
cluding that insanity and mens rea cannot coexist, quoted Blackstone: "[To constitute a crime
against human laws, there must be, first, a vicious will; and secondly, an unlawful act conse-
quent upon such vicious will." But, in this same paragraph, Blackstone writes: "[A]s no tem-
poral tribunal can search the heart, or fathom the intentions of the mind, otherwise than they
are demonstrated by outward actions, it therefore cannot punish for what it cannot know."
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMmENTARiES § 21. Blackstone thus vacillates on this point.
231. Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 53 J. URB.
L. 471, 488 (1976).
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Inherent Shortcomings of the Insanity Defense
The GBMI verdict, though adding an alternative to the NGRI ver-
dict, does not alleviate the fallacious presumptions underlying any in-
sanity plea. The insanity plea is based, first of all, on the legal premise
that insanity exists and is definable and classifiable. As noted above,232
experts disagree on this presumption, some denying that insanity is
a meaningful concept, and others who, although admitting that insanity
exists, say it is not ascertainable. Since medical experts are called upon
to testify in many criminal trials regarding the defendant's sanity or
insanity, a paradox results.233
Assuming, arguendo, that insanity exists and is determinable, other
fallacious premises hamper any insanity defense. The first is that in-
tent can be objectively ascertained. But some legal commentators and
many psychiatrists point out that "intent" can never be discovered.
It is a "legal outcast" that lives "within the human head,"23 ' having
no existence outside of the behavior it supposedly prompts. Because
intent can be inferred only from conduct, the statement that there can
be no crime without intent in addition to a criminal act makes no sense.
"It is legal catatonia."235 Intent, say some psychiatrists, has little to
do with maladaptive behavior.236 The legal doctrine joining the two
has been reified by the courts without regard for the fact that it is
a man-made doctrine, changeable by man.237
The second fallacious premise is that there is a discoverable link be-
tween the defendant's mental state and his criminal act. But that causal
relationship between insanity and criminal behavior is far from a mat-
232. See discussion in the text, supra at notes 43-50. Psychiatrist Martin Blinder argues that
the expert should not burden the judicial process with such indefinables as "the mental capacity
to form malice," or other "congenitally defective children issuing from the unhappy marriage
of law and psychiatry." Blinder, Why It's Crazy for a Psychiatrist o Talk About Insanity, 23
CATH. U.L. Ray. 769, 773 (1974). See also Livermore, Malimquist & Meehl, On the Justification
for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75, 80 (1968): "One need only to glance at the
diagnostic manual of the American Psychiatric Association to learn what an elastic concept men-
tal illness is."
233. Schulman urges psychiatrists to refuse to testify on the question of insanity at criminal
trials, adding: "The man-hours wasted by experts, not to mention the cost to all of us, on insanity
pleas is absurd and an outrageous fraud on the public by both the legal system and the expert
community." Schulman, To Be or Not to Be an Expert, 1973 WA H. U.L.Q. 57, 66.
John Suarez, M.D., of the U.C.L.A. Neuropsychiatric Institute, estimates that more than 90%
of the behavioral science resources devoted to the criminal justice system is allocated to labeling
defendants "sane" or "insane" in criminal trials. Allen, The Brawner Rule-New Lyrics for
an Old Tune, 1973 WASH. U.Q. 67 n. 12.
234. Levitt, Extent and Function of the Doctrine ofMens Rea, 17 Iu. .L. REv. 578, 579 (1923).
235. Id. at 580. Professor Levitt continues: "So that for practical purposes you do not care
what the intent really was. The act is important and the act only." Id. at 583.
236. Schulman, To Be or Not to Be an Expert, 1973 WAsH. U. L.Q. 57, 60.
237. Id.
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ter of agreement among experts. Whether the causal relationship is
described in terms of "product" (as in Durham) or "result" (as in
Brawner), the difficulty is inescapable. Judge Leventhal's majority opin-
ion in Brawner notes that it has become commonplace for psychiatrists
called by the government and the defense to agree that the defendant
suffered from a mental disease at the time of his criminal act, yet for
the government witnesses to find that the act was not a product of
the disease and the defense witnesses to argue that it was.23 The prod-
uct language triggers conclusory testimony by the experts.39
A third fallacious premise is that the opinions of experts are reliable
and valid.210 Studies indicate that neither presumption is true. In one
study, even under a "reliability" maximizing procedure, the rate of
agreement about the existence and nature of character disorders was
only 54% among the participating psychiatrists;2"' in another study,
43 experienced psychiatrists, after viewing a filmed interview with a
patient, could not agree whether he was or was not psychotic: 17
psychiatrists thought he was and 26 thought he was not.242 Thus, while
courts assume that psychiatric judgments are reliable, studies indicate
this assumption is false.24 3
Studies also indicate that psychiatric diagnoses are invalid.44 These
conclusions were reached in a three-year study of indicted felony defen-
dants found incompetent to stand trial.2" Particularly with regard to
dangerousness, psychiatrists cannot predict accurately enough to be more
often right than wrong. Of those defendants who psychiatrists predicted
would be dangerous, 14% of those released to the community were
238. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 982 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also supra note 157.
239. 471 F.2d at 983. This difficulty was not removed by the abandonment of the Durham
test and the adoption of the Brawner test, although Judge Leventhal optimistically assumed it
would be.
240. "Reliability" refers to the frequency of agreement when two or more independent observers
answer the same question. "Validity" refers to the accuracy of the judgment of two or more
independent observers. Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAIF. L. REV. 693, 697 (1974).
241. Id. at 703. The study, by Beck and coworkers, was reported in 119 AM J. PSYCHIATRY
351, 352-55 (1962). Another study of 6,263 patients yielded only 60% agreement among clini-
cians. Id. V. NoRis, MENTAL ILLNESS IN LONDON 42-53 (1959).
242. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 240, at 704. See also Katz, Cole & Lowery, Studies of the
Diagnostic Process: The Influence of Symptom Perception, Past Experience and Ethnic Background
in Diagnostic Decisions, 125 AM. J. PsyctiTrY 937 (1969).
243. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 240, at 707. NoRius, supra note 241, at 546, says that
psychiatrists disagree even about the terms "psychosis," "mental illness," and "psychopathy,"
and value judgments affect their classification of the individual defendant, resulting in conflicts
whenever more than one psychiatrist testifies.
244. Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear
and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUT. L. REy. 1084 (1976).
245. Id. at 1096.
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subsequently arrested for violent crimes. Of those predicted to be non-
dangerous, 16% were subsequently arrested for violent crimes.2 6 Fur-
thermore, the study revealed that the only factor that actually influenced
the psychiatrists' prediction of the defendant's dangerousness was his
current alleged offense: the more serious the alleged crime, the more
likely it was that the psychiatrist would find him dangerous."47 Yet
the psychiatrists, in detailing their reasons for finding the defendant
to be dangerous, mentioned the defendant's current charge in only one-
third of the cases.2" Instead, they cited most frequently "delusional
or impaired thinking.1
249
These findings are disquieting, in view of the use of the criterion
of dangerousness to determine the involuntary commitment of criminal
defendants found NGRI. 210 If dangerousness cannot be predicted with
any certainty, all NGRI defendants would presumably have good reason
to demand and receive release from commitment, by way of the equal
protection challenge.
The fourth incorrect presumption underlying the insanity defense is
that it is a bona fide search for the truth. In fact, the defense may
be a ploy for use as a last resort when the defendant believes he is
certain to be found guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
Operating like a plea bargain, it has been called a "waiver of rights
in exchange for avoidance of criminal liability.' '2S In at least two
jurisdictions where commitment following a successful insanity defense
was automatic, prosecutors raised the plea more often than the
defense.2 5 2 This situation is unlikely to occur now that due process and
equal protection challenges have made release of the NGRI defendant
more likely.
2"3
The successful effort of defense counsel to bar the introduction of
a letter written by attempted-assassin John Hinckley, reveals the dis-
ingenuousness of the insanity plea. The defense argued that the letter,
written while he was in prison awaiting trial, was illegally obtained
because it was intercepted and read by prison officials.25 4 Aside from
246. Id. at 1098.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 162-174.
251. Comment, supra note 189, at 712. It has also been called a confession by which, after
all the elements of the offense charged have been established, the defendant bargains for the
status of suspended guilt. Goldstein, The Brawner Rule-Why? Or No More Nonsense on Non
Sense in the Criminal Law, Please!", 1973 NVAsH. U.L.Q. 126, 135.
252. German & Slinger, Punishing the Not Guilty, 29 RuT. L. REv. 1011, 1021 n.43 (1976).
253. Id.
254. Reported in the Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, Feb. 24, 1981, at 3A.
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search-and-seizure issues, if the effort to ascertain Hinckley's mental
condition were sincere, presumably any evidence would be welcome.
Nor does the truth necessarily emerge from the testimony of expert
witnesses, for they may not be impartial. Defense attorneys claim that
court-appointed psychiatrists are more likely to be favorable to the
prosecution than to the defense."' Because these psychiatrists are usually
connected with public mental hospitals that are often overcrowded,
they may tend to label a defendant insane only when his mental condi-
tion is so debilitating that he would be admitted to the state facility
under ordinary conditions, although the standard for the insanity defense
requires no such condition." 6
Other factors preclude the emergence of truth from psychiatrists'
testimony. One controlled experiment revealed that the diagnoses of
psychiatric residents were greatly influenced by both the imagined
socioeconomic history of the patient and the perceived diagnoses of
other, prestigious psychiatrists, independent of the clinical picture
presented.2 -7 Other studies indicated that lower socioeconomic persons
were presumed to be impulsive and more prone to violence.2"8 Another
study revealed that the psychiatrist's diagnosis reflected his own value
system and self-image, his own personality structure and problems,
causing his judgments to be less informative about the patient than
about the clinician himself."5 9 Therapists' perceptions of the patient's
pathology reflected their attitude toward the patient; for example, mental
health professionals believed that patients who stated radical views were
more disturbed than patients with similar psychiatric complaints whose
political views were conventional.60 And the patient's psychopathology
was substantially increased when he criticized the mental health pro-
fession, while flattering the profession tended to decrease the patient's
perceived symptomology.6'
255. Reisner & Semmel, Abolishing the Insanity Defense: A Look at the Proposed Federal
Criminal Code Reform Act in Light of the Swedish Experience, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 753, 782 (1974).
256. Id. at 782.
257. Lee & Temerlin, Social Class, Diagnosis, and Prognosis for Psychotherapy, 7
PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RESEARCH & PRAC. 181 (1970), cited in Ennis & Litwack, supra note
240, at 725.
258. Ordway, Experiences in Evaluating Dangerousness in Private Practice and in a Court
Clinic, in THE CLINICAL EVALUATION OF THE DANGEROUSNESS OF THE MENTALLY ILL 35 (1967),
cited in Ennis & Litwack supra note 240, at 725.
259. Raines & Rohrer, The Operational Matrix of Psychiatric Practices 1, 111 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY
721, 733 (1955), cited in Ennis & Litwack, supra note 240.
260. Braginsky & Braginsky, Psychologists: High Priests of the Middle Class, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY (Dec. 1973), at 15, 139, cited in Ennis & Litwack, supra note 240, at 728.
261. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 240, at 730-31. The authors also cite a study in which eight
normal persons gained admission to twelve psychiatric hospitals by complaining of hearing voices
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The fifth illogical presumption upon which the insanity defense is
based is that nonresponsibility is a total excuse for behavior otherwise
criminal. This concept runs counter to the mores of our society, in
which each person is taught that he is responsible for his actions. A
well-known professor of law, psychiatry, and criminology writes:
IT]he whole process leading to an adjudication of non-responsibility
may be counter-therapeutic. Is not the whole objective of therapy
to help the patient accept the fact that he must take control of
his life and make choices of behavior on reality-oriented grounds
and not on fantasies? For the psychopath-sociopath-antisocial per-
sonality, an acquittal "by reason of insanity" provides the one,
irrefutable defense against any efforts at behavior change: "I can't
help myself; I'm sick!" Shades of "Dear Officer Krupke!"26
After being "excused" because he was "not responsible" for his crime,
the defendant/patient enters a mental hospital where therapists attempt
to convince him he must be responsible for his future actions, though
to take that advice will be to his detriment in future criminal behavior!1
3
The Hinckley Trial and Its Aftermath
The defects of the insanity defense were glaringly exposed nationwide
during the trial of John W. Hinckley for the attempted assassination
of President Reagan. The opinions of mental health experts occupied
almost two-thirds of the trial.24 Instead of focusing on the question
of whether Hinckley intended'to kill the President, expert testimony
roamed far afield, dealing with such generalized themes as brain
shrinkage, depression, schizophrenia, narcissism, delusions of grandeur,
the sense of remorse, and human relationships.26- The most notable
saying "empty," "hollow," and "thud," but reporting no other symptoms. Although psychiatrists
note that schizophrenic patients exhibit at least five classical symptoms (hallucinations, delu-
sions, lack of reality testing, disordered thought processes, and withdrawn behavior), all patients
were admitted with only the single reported symptom. They were diagnosed as schizophrenic,
and upon claiming no longer to hear the voices, were discharged with the diagnosis of
"schizophrenia in remission."
262. Allen, The Brawner Rule-New Lyrics for an Old Tune, 1973 WAsH. U.L.Q. 67, 84-85.
263. Dr. Abraham Halpern points out that in New York state under the new Insanity Defense
Reform Act, see supra text accompanying note 190, the Manhattan district attorney protested
that his office is placed in the ironic position of first trying to convince the jury that the defen-
dant was sane, and then, if the defendant is found not responsible by reason of insanity, of
trying to convince the judge that the defendant is insane (and so should remain committed in
the mental institution instead of being released as sane)! Halpern, Rachlin & Portnow, New
York's Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1980: A Forensic Psychiatry Perspective, 45 ALB. L.
REv. 661, 665 (1981).
264. Kraft, Putting the Trial nn Trial, Washington Post, June 24, 1982, at A23, col. 1.
265. Id. The prosecution, on the other hand, contended that Hinckley's actions on the day
of the crime-showering, breakfasting at McDonald's, browsing in a bookstore, writing a letter
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feature of their testimony was the experts' complete lack of agreement
about the defendant's mental condition.266
Dr. William Carpenter, director of the Maryland Psychiatric Research
Center, a defense witness, said Hinckley suffered from a disease called
"process schizophrenia," which he defined as a "severe form of men-
tal illness. ' 267 Dr. Park Dietz, a prosecution witness, who teaches at
Harvard Medical School, responded, "In my view that is not an ac-
curate diagnosis of Mr. Hinckley on March 30, 1981, or any other
time. Mr. Hinckley is not schizophrenic.' 268 But Dr. David M. Bear,
a colleague of Dr. Dietz at Harvard Medical School and a defense
witness, said "with confidence" that Hinckley had a severe mental
illness--but a different mental illness: "schizophrenia spectrum dis-
order. 1 69 (Dr. Bear also called the therapy prescribed by Dr. John
Hopper, a Colorado psychiatrist who had treated Hinckley for six
months before the crime, "a disaster," and posited that Hinckley's
psychological control may have been impaired by that therapy.270)
Yale psychologist Ernst Prelinger, also a defense witness, diagnosed
Hinckley's mental problems as "ambulatory schizophrenia," but Dr.
Dietz said that ambulatory schizophrenia is not a type of disease at
all, and in any event, Hinckley did not suffer from that illness .271 Dr.
Thomas C. Goldman, another defense witness, described Hinckley's
illness as a "schizotypal personality disorder with psychosis. 22 Dr.
Dietz, on the other hand, said Hinckley had a "schizoid personality
disorder," which is nonpsychotic, and with this disorder, the individual
"knows the difference between reality and what is not real." With
such lack of consensus among psychiatrists about a matter so fundamen-
tal as the diagnosis of Hinckley's mental state, the value of their
testimony may be questioned. The confusion of the jurors seems
understandable.2 "1
Nor could the psychiatrists agree about whether Hinckley's mental
to actress Jodie Foster saying he intended to "get" Reagan, and taking a taxi to the Hilton
Hotel-showed "a competent mind at work." Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, May 21, 1982, at All, col. 6.
266. Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, May 21, 1982, at All, col. 6.
267. Id. col. 4.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id., May 19, 1982, at A4, col. 3. Previously Dr. Hopper had testified that Hinckley
had "no psychosis or thought disorder" and that he might have been "exaggerating his anxiety
spells." Id., May 11, 1982, at A3, col. 1. These opinions were specifically prohibited by the
Washington decision because they are conclusory. See supra text accompanying notes 93, 115-116.
271. Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, June 9, 1982, at A15, col. 5.
272. Id., col. 6.
273. Jurors said the psychiatric testimony was difficult to understand because the psychiatrists
gave long, confusing answers. One juror said, "By the time they get around to telling you what
it's about, you forget what the question was." Washington Post, June 25, 1982, at A3, col. 2.
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problems prevented him from forming the intent necessary to commit
the crime. Dr. Goldman said that on the day Hinckley shot the Presi-
dent, he was "like a freight train on a track with no brakes."27 ' But
Dr. Sally Johnson, psychiatrist on the staff of the federal prison at
Butner, Maryland, the first psychiatrist to interview Hinckley and the
one who saw the defendant fifty-seven times (more than any other doc-
tor), testified for the prosecution that Hinckley planned his crime right
up to the moment he pulled the trigger.75 And Dr. Dietz testified for
the prosecution that Hinckley elected consciously to shoot President
Reagan when he could have chosen another course of action.
27 6
The link between Hinckley's mental state and his criminal behavior
was likewise shown to be undiscoverable, except by resort to the defen-
dant's own testimony. While prosecution experts painted a picture of
Hinckley as a man who set a goal of assassinating the President, because
he told doctors immediately after the shooting, "I accomplished
everything I was going for, ' 277 defense experts saw him as "tormented
and driven to the shooting by an inner rage and by deranged thoughts
of suicide and murder. ' 2  When the prosecution argued that Hinckley's
obvious planning for the shooting indicated he was not disoriented on
the day of the crime, a defense expert responded that mentally ill per-
sons can calculate, plan, and premeditate "some of the most bizarre
kind of activities.
'279
The presumption that the insanity defense constitutes a search for
truth was also shown to be fallacious at the Hinckley trial. Dr. Carpenter
said he learned gradually about Hinckley's fantasy life in their twenty-
four sessions, but he neglected to mention until he was cross-examined
that at the start of their sessions he had lent Hinckley a diagnostic
manual describing the symptoms of mental illness.280 He also testified
that Hinckley regarded as "trivial" his shooting of the President and
the others, but under cross-examination he admitted that he himself
had so characterized the shooting during an interview with Hinckley,
"to provoke a conclusion."1
28'
Another defect of the insanity defense was amply demonstrated during
the trial: that it is a rich man's defense and thus arguably discriminatory
against poor defendants. Hinckley's defense attorney employed a team
274. Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, May 20, 1982, at A7, col. 3.
275. Id., June 13, 1982, at C6, cols. 3, 4, 5.
276. Id., June 14, 1982, at A7, col. 2.
277. Id., June 8, 1982, at B14, col. 1.
278. Id., col. 2.
279. N.Y. Times, May 5, 1982, at D27, col. 2.
280. Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, May 18, 1982, at A12, col. 5.
281. Id.
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of six psychiatrists and psychologists. Two members of that team
estimated that costs for their services would be at least $100,000 and
perhaps closer to $200,000.282 Assuming the other members billed at
the same rate, the cost of the mental experts to the Hinckleys could
be about $600,000.
In previous insanity defense trials, juries presented with contradic-
tory testimony by mental health experts have sometimes relied instead
upon the testimony of other observers.283 But the parade of prestigious
psychiatrists and psychologists had persuaded at least two of the Hinck-
ley jurors of one fact: that Hinckley was a man with some mental
disorder.2 8 4 Although the jurors could not reconcile the experts' con-
flicting statements, they could not bring themselves to reject or ignore
that testimony. And since Hinckley was being tried under the federal
rule for insanity, the burden was placed upon the prosecution to prove
that Hinckley was sane beyond a reasonable doubt when he commit-
ted the crime.283 Aware of the historic importance of its decision and
conscientiously attempting to apply "the law" to the facts of the case,
the jurors felt they had only two alternatives: to pronounce Hinckley
sane when they knew he was not, or to pronounce him innocent when
they knew he was not. Given this Hobson's choice, they chose to find
him "not guilty by reason of insanity."
Shortly after the trial, five of the Hinckley jurors appeared volun-
tarily before the'Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Law and
expressed their frustration at being forced to choose between two un-
satisfactory options.8 ' They also called for changes in the insanity
282. Washington Post, June 23, 1982, at All, col. 5. On the man-hours wasted by mental
health experts in testifying at insanity trials, see supra note 233.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81. Therefore, the prosecution produced two witnesses
who testified that Hinckley "appeared normal, alert, and in control of himself" immediately
after his arrest for the shootings. Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, June 3, 1982, at C6, col. 1. Detective
Arthur E. Myers of the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, who had first seen
Hinckley twenty minutes after the shootings and remained with him for most of the next seven
hours, said that Hinckley appeared relieved that he had shot the President. Id., col. 2.
284. Washington Post, June 23, 1982, at Al, col. 1. However, at least two jurors believed
that Hinckley knew what he was doing when he shot the President. Id.
285. Defense lawyers had persuaded Judge Barrington D. Parker that to try the defendant
under District of Columbia burden of proof as to the ten local charges and under the federal
law as to the three appended federal charges would be unnecessarily confusing to the jury. Id.,
June 22, 1982, at Al, col. 2. Thus Judge Parker instructed the jury that Hinckley had to be
presumed legally insane at the time of the crime unless the prosecution could prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he was sane and in control of his actions. Id., June 23, 1982, at AI0,
col. 1. This principle has been the law in federal courts since the case of Travers v. United
States, 6 App. D.C. 450, 464 (1895). About half the states place the burden of proving insanity
upon the defendant by a preponderance of evidence. W. LA FAvE & A. ScoTT, CIMINAL LAW
§ 40 (1972).
286. Washington Post, June 25, 1982, at A3, col. 3.
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defense.287 Had they been able to find Hinckley guilty but mentally
ill, they would have chosen that option.288 One juror added that he
did not believe that any of the experts had "unraveled what was going
on in Hinckley's mind the day of the shooting. Nobody knew what
was in the head of the defendant that day." '28 9
Medical experts, legal experts, and the general public were amazed
at the not guilty verdict of the Hinckley jury.290 Almost unanimously,
critics assigned blame for the decision to the legal rule and the psychiatric
testimony. Articles and editorials appeared in the press entitled (inter
alia) "A Travesty of Justice,' 29' "Bogus Science, Bogus Justice,
'292
"Is Justice Crazy?,' 293 and "Verdict: Guilty-And Insane.' 29 Time
Magazine asked rhetorically, "Is the System Guilty?"2 95 These reac-
tions seemed to confirm the findings of a nationwide poll of 1,601
Americans showing that 87% believed that too many people accused
of murder are using the insanity defense to keep from going to prison,
and only 2000 believed courts should continue to allow persons on trial
for murder to plead innocent by reason of insanity.
29 6
State legislatures moved quickly to respond to the demands of their
citizens to modify the insanity plea. Hours after the Hinckley verdict
the Delaware legislature added a guilty but insane plea, providing that
defendants found guilty but insane be treated in mental institutions
until they recover, then be transferred to prisons to finish their
287. Id., June 23, 1982, at A8, col. 3.
288. Id., col. 4.
289. Id., June 25, 1982, at A3, col. 5.
290. Id., June 23, 1982, at A10, col. 1. For example, Dr. Abraham L. Halpern, director of
the Department of Psychiatry at United Hospital in Port Chester, New York, and a longtime
opponent of the insanity defense, said: "The verdict is an American tragedy that ... endangers
the lives of public officials by people who may be disordered, but still have the power to control
their conduct." Treasury Secretary Donald Regan said he thought the jury's verdict was "beyond
belief." Id., June 23, 1982, at A7, col. 2. William Raspberry, columnist for The Washington
Post, wrote that probably the greatest harm done by the Hinckley decision was the damage to
the public perception of justice. "Anyone who follows the psychiatric gibberish of the experts
testifying for and against the defendant can be forgiven for concluding that the system itself
is crazy." Id., June 25, 1982, at A31, col. 5. Not all were critical of the jurors' verdict, however.
Dr. Alan A. Stone, a professor of law and psychiatry at Harvard University said,
I thought they would ignore the judge's instructions, get confused by all the con-
flicting testimony, and end up with a gut reaction that Hinckley was a bad person
and find him guilty. ... I was shocked with the result and it left me with a feeling
of admiration for the jury. It listened to the judge's instructions.
Id., June 23, 1982, at A10, col. 1.
291. Id., by James J. Kilpatrick, June 24, 1982, at A10, col. 1.
292. Id., by R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr., June 28, 1982, at A13, col. 1.
293. Id., June 23, 1982, at A26 (Editorial) col. 1.
294. Id., by William Raspberry, June 25, 1982, at A31, col. 1.
295. TIME, July 5, 1982, at 26.
296. Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, Oct. 21, 1981, at A8, col. 1.
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sentences.297 So did Georgia298 and Kentucky.29 9 Modification of the
insanity plea has also been proposed in Arizona, Colorado, Connec-
ticut, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.00 Alabama has become the
third state to abolish the insanity plea as a total defense to crime.30 ,
A Senate bill to severely limit the insanity plea, introduced by Senators
Strom Thurmond (Republican, South Carolina) and Orrin Hatch
(Republican, Utah), before the Hinckley decision, gained momentum
thereafter, with fifty-two Senate cosponsors."0 Among other provi-
sions "to strengthen law enforcement in the areas of violent crime," the
bill provides that a defendant may plead that as a result of mental
disease or defect he lacked the state of mind required as an element
of the offense charged, but that "mental disease or defect does not
otherwise constitute a defense."3 3 The bill thus abolishes the separate
insanity defense, allowing evidence of mental disease or defect to be
admitted only to the extent that it reduces or negates the scienter ele-
ment of the offense. The bill originally retained the NGRI verdict, but
an amendment has recently been added to delete that verdict, replacing
it with "guilty but insane."3
Another measure, introduced by Senator Arlen Specter (Republican,
Pennsylvania) a month after the Hinckley decision, would place the
burden of proof of insanity on the defendant in federal courts and
restrict the testimony of mental health experts to observations of the
defendant's behavior, precluding them from stating their opinions of
whether his mental disease prevented him from controlling his con-
duct or realizing that it was wrong.30 The obfuscatory language of
the Model Penal Code test would thus be removed. Whether the new
297. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 408 (Supp. 1982).
298. H.B. 1290, signed by Governor on Apr. 16, 1982.
299. Act of Feb. 23, 1982, 1982 Ky. REv. STAT. & R. SERV. 220 (Baldwin).
300. Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, June 24, 1982, at A8, col. 3.
301. There is a question as to the validity of the Alabama statute, however, sifice the Governor
inadvertently applied a pocket veto by failing to file the signed bill with the Secretary of State
within the prescribed time period. The Alabama bill is patterned after the Idaho law. Letter
from Charles Graddick, Alabama Attorney General, to Gertrude Block (Sept. 23, 1982). Mon-
tana and Idaho had abolished the defense before the Hinckley trial, Montana in 1981 and Idaho
in 1982. For discussion of the Idaho statute, see infra text and accompanying notes 315-320.
302. S. 2572, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
303. Id. § 4242(a).
304. Id. § 4242(c)(3).
305. S. 2658, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., CONG. INDEX, (CCH). 97th Cong., 1981-82. A rash of
bills were introduced in the House and Senate after the attempted assassination-a total of seventeen
in the House and six in the Senate between June 21 and August 25, 1982-to abolish or restrict
the insanity plea. Two House bills proposed eliminating the defense in presidential assassinations.
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language of the Specter bill would prevent mental health experts from
presenting the kind of testimony they offered at the Hinckley trial is
questionable, however, since "observations of behavior" may be in-
terpreted to include judgments about the defendant's mental state.
President Reagan has proposed a substantial limitation of the in-
sanity defense as part of a three-part legislative package called the
Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1982.306 According to Associate At-
torney General Rudolph W. Giuliana, the insanity defense would be
limited to those so paranoid or retarded that they "believed [they] were
shooting at a house instead of a human being."3 7 Except in such ex-
treme cases, consideration of the mitigating effects of mental illness
would be left to a judge at sentencing."8 The particulars of this pro-
posal have not been released; however, removing all consideration of
mental illness from the trial would almost certainly be held to violate
the defendant's due process rights to have all issues concerning guilt
considered.
The Idaho Statute
Idaho's new statute abolishing mental illness as a total defense to
criminal conduct0 9 is providing a model for states rushing to reform
their insanity rules. Since the Hinckley verdict, requests for the statute
have poured in from more than twenty states.3"' Idaho's new statute,
like modifications of the insanity defense adopted by other states,3"
resulted from public outrage following the successful use of the NGRI
defense by a defendant, who, on acquittal, committed additional crimes.
306. S. 2903, HousE CALENDAR, Sept. 20, 1982.
307. N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1982, at All, col. 5.
308. Id.
309. The new statutes provide, inter alia, for the repeal of IDAHO CODE §§ 18-208, -209, -213,
& -214, amending id. ch. 2, tit. 18, by the addition of a new § 18-207, to provide that mental
illness shall not be a defense, to provide for incarceration and treatment of offenders suffering
from mental illness, and to allow expert testimony on the issue of intent; amending id. §§ 18-310,
-311, eliminating the right of the defendant to refuse treatment ordered by a court; amending
id. § 19-2305, to remove reference to acquittal by reason of insanity; amending id., ch. 25, tit.
19, by the addition of a new § 19-2523, to provide for consideration and treatment of a defen-
dant's mental illness at sentencing; and amending id., ch. 13, tit. 66, by the addition of a new
§ 66-1318, allowing the transfer of inmates with mental illness to noncorrectional facilities accord-
ing to prescribed rules and regulations.
310. Washington Post, June 24, 1982, at A6, col. 1.
311. For discussion of the events preceding the New York and Michigan laws, see, e.g., supra
text accompanying notes 178-185 & 196-201. Indiana adopted the GBMI verdict after a man
found innocent by reason of insanity after murdering baseball star Lyman Bostock was freed
seven months after the killing. Alaska adopted the GBMI verdict after a former mental patient,
released as sane, admitted killing four teenagers soon afterwards. Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, June
24, 1982, at 4A, col. 2.
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The defendant, Michael Hightower, raped a woman in 1972, and was
acquitted on the ground that he was mentally defective. Committed
to the Idaho security-mental health facility, he was released to an
unguarded health center in 1973, and he walked away. Two hours later
he kidnapped and raped a Boise college student. Captured two months
later, he was again acquitted on the ground of mental illness and sent
back to the state mental facility. At a hearing in 1975, after Hightower's
request to be released to a less restricted facility, two of three
psychiatrists stated that Hightower had been sane at the time of the
two rapes for which he had been found NGRI3 12
Because of the testimony of the two psychiatrists, the trial court
reversed and remanded, and at the new trial Hightower was convicted
of rape and sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment. But the state
supreme court reversed and remanded,313 and Hightower moved to
Washington, D.C., where he was able to get a job at a center for juvenile
delinquents because of good references from Idaho psychologists.
Shortly thereafter he kidnapped and shot a nurse." '
Idaho's new law is intended to avoid this kind of situation. While
providing that mental illness is not, in itself, a defense to crime, it
does permit expert testimony at trial "on the issues of mens rea, or
any state of mind which is an element of the offense, subject to the
rules of evidence."3 '5 Lack of the ability to form the necessary intent
to commit a crime would therefore presumably negate or reduce
culpability. The lemon-squeezing spouse would be acquitted under this
test, but defendants like Hightower and Hinckley would probably be
found guilty. Under new Idaho law, the court would then hear
psychiatric testimony to determine whether their prison sentence should
include psychiatric care.31 6 The court will authorize treatment if it con-
cludes by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant suffers from
a severe and reliably diagnosable mental defect that makes him unable
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform it to the
requirements of law;317 if without treatment the prognosis is for serious
mental or physical deterioration of the individual;31 1 if treatment is
available;3 9 and if the relative risks versus benefits of treatment would
312. Washington Post, June 24, 1982, at A6, col. 3.
313. Idaho v. Hightower, 101 Idaho 749, 620 P.2d 783 (1980).
314. Washington Post, June 24, 1982, at A6, col. 3.
315. IDAHO CODE § 18-207(c) (1982).
316. Id., § 19-2522.
317. Id., § 19-2523(2)(a). This is the language of MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962), used
by federal courts as the standard for determining insanity. See supra text accompanying note 104.
318. IDAHO CODE § 19-2523(2)(b) (1982).
319. Id. § 2523(2)(c).
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persuade a reasonable person to consent to it.320 In addition to authoriz-
ing treatment, the court will pronounce sentence. Because imprison-
ment suspends all civil rights of the person so sentenced, including the
right to refuse treatment, medical treatment will be mandatory."'
Reactions to the Idaho law were as expected. Greg Bower, chief
deputy criminal prosecutor for Ada County, where Boise is located,
said, "It's going to eliminate the old game of 'let's see if we can con-
fuse the jury.' ,,322 But David Nevin, a deputy defender, said, "The
Hightower case was unfortunate.... I have basket cases, literally people
who do not know what they are doing, and all those people are going
to go to prison.
' '3 23
Bower's optimism seems justified. Under the Idaho statute, while
experts still may testify at criminal trials, their testimony will be restricted
to whether the defendant lacked the necessary mens rea (intent to commit
the crime with which he is charged).2  Other indications of intent, such
as the ability to plan and execute the criminal act, will probably be
accorded more weight, and the domination of criminal trials when sanity
is in question may be ended. Nevin's fears seem unwarranted. Because
the Idaho law permits lack of intent to negate or reduce criminal
behavior, although it should restrict the number of persons whose
criminal behavior will be excused, the "basket cases" he referred to
should still be excused.
The constitutionality of the Idaho law will no doubt soon be chal-
lenged. But since it permits evidence regarding the mental condition
of the defendant to be introduced at trial and permits mental condi-
tion to mitigate or remove guilt if it prevented the accused from form-
ing the requisite intent, the Idaho law should withstand due process
challenges. The statute should succeed in its intent: to limit the insanity
defense to those defendants who are manifestly deserving, excluding
the defendant about whose mental condition not even his own
psychiatrist knows for sure.
Arguments for Retention of the Insanity Defense
Those who argue that the insanity defense should be retained give
320. Id. § 2523(2)(d).
321. Id. 18-310(1). Section 18-310(1) is amended by the addition of a new § 3317, which pro-
vides that when treatment is given over the objection of a patient, there is a review of the deci-
sion to do so, independent of the treating professional, and that a statement explaining the reasons
for the treatment be entered in the patient's treatment record and signed by the facility
administrator.
322. Washington Post, June 24, 1982, at A6, col. 1.
323. Id., col. 2.
324. IDAHO CODE § 18-207(c) (1982).
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three reasons. First, it is an ancient and venerated legal doctrine . 2
Ancient the doctrine is-and archaic. It worked well enough in the
days when a person was labeled "crazy" only because of his generally
erratic behavior, and no psychiatrists were around to question the
diagnosis. But some psychiatrists now label a person insane who seems
by his general behavior to be sane, sometimes merely because of his
criminal behavior.2 6 The modern medical view of the mental state as
a continuum, with no clear division between sanity and insanity, is
at odds with the legal presumption that a dividing line separates the
two states.3 27 So modern psychiatric theories are not translatable to
the legal model of insanity.1
28
The second argument forwarded by proponents of the insanity defense
is that it is used by only a tiny percentage of persons accused of criminal
behavior.29 This argument bad more validity in the past; the number
of defendants pleading insanity has increased in recent years . 3 Infre-
quency of use does not, however, excuse its defects. Furthermore, the
defense is most used in heinous crimes in which the defendant is patently
guilty and has no other defense available, as in the Hinckley assassina-
tion attempt. Therefore, it frees from responsibility for his crime a
defendant who would otherwise be held responsible.
Finally, proponents of the insanity defense argue that by labeling
a few persons insane and therefore not responsible for their actions,
we.are telling the great majority of persons that they are responsible
325. Dr. Henry C. Weinstein, Director of Psychiatry at New York's Bellevue Uospital and
Professor of Law at New York University Law School, a proponent of the insanity defense,
says: "Mhe insanity defense, in some form or another, exists in every civilized society....
I think it existed in ancient civilized societies; it happens to exist in modern uncivilized societies
in Africa." Transcript of Panel Discussion, The MacNeil-Lehrer Report, supra note 156, at 3.
Professor Alan Dershowitz of Harvard Law School adds:
Since our ancestral common law emerged out of the darkness of the early barbaric
days, there has always been an insanity defense. It was in the Bible; it was in the
Code of Hammurabi. It is an essential, moral underpinning of the criminal law.
We need it, and it doesn't hurt.
Id. at 4-5.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
328. Panel discussion on insanity defense, held at the University of Florida College of Law,
Sept. 22, 1982 (statement of Dr. Arthur Sullwold, Assistant Professor of Psychiatry, University
of Florida College of Medicine).
329. See, e.g., supra note 325, at 5 (statement of Professor Dershowitz).
330. No national statistics are available, but Dr. Abraham Halpern, Chairman, Department
of Psychiatry, United Hospital, Port Chester, New York, and Clinical Professor of Psychiatry,
New York Medical College, an advocate of abolishing the insanity defense, states that in New
York state in the 1950s one person a year was acquitted by reason of insanity and that number
had risen "dramatically" to 55 a year by 1979. He further argues that many such cases are
plea bargained and thus never come to trial. See supra note 325, at 6.
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and will be held accountable. Professor Alan Dershowitz of Harvard
Law School says that we are thus saying to the criminal defendant,
"You are sane and we will hold you responsible. We are not treating
you the same as the person who shot a human being thinking it [sic]
was a robot, or as the person who squeezed a throat thinking it was
a melon.' 3 1 Leaving aside the fact that defendants described by Pro-
fessor Dershowitz would be found not guilty without an insanity defense
because they are unable to form the requisite intent necessary to com-
mit the crime with which they were charged, the insanity defense has
been notoriously unsuccessful in identifying which defendants are really
insane and which are only spoofing.332 So, far from convincing defen-
dants that they are "responsible," the plea provides a ploy by which
those patently guilty may escape responsibility for their behavior.
The Case for Abolition of the Insanity Defense
Thus the insanity defense, despite the best efforts of the courts to
make it effective, has failed in its purpose and should be abolished.
Some critics urge that not only the defense itself but the entire concept
of mens rea be abandoned.33 The instruction to the jury could then
be, "Did the defendant commit the specific act charged?" Adherents
of this view generally reject the "futile exercise of calibrating respon-
sibility to a chimerical scale of legal guilt," 33' and would make the
criterion for the fact-finder the individual's social dangerousness, not
his blameworthiness. The idea "contemplates an enhancement of the
dignity and public respect for law enforcement.' '" 31 This view was well
stated as early as 1929:
From a practical point of view, does it make any real difference
whether we label a man responsible or irresponsible? Would it be
not equally pragmatic to hold everyone responsible for his acts,
whether sane or insane, and then to adopt measures that will: (1)
insure society against further criminal acts on the part of this per-
331. See supra note 325, at 5.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 126-127.
333. For examples of the proposal's advocates, see S. GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY (1962);
S. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME (1967); K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF
PUNlISsNT (1969); P. RocHE, THE CRIMINAL MInD (1958); B. WOOTON, CRIME AND THE CRmNAL
LAW (1963); Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the Insanity Defense-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853
(1963); Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 514 (1968); Schulman,
To Be or Not To Be an Expert, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 19, 57.
334. ROCHE, supra note 333, at 273.
335. Id. Professor Roche adds that all persons, irrespective of mental state, should be regarded
as "responsible" in the sense that they are susceptible to legal sanctions in keeping with the
aims of deterrence, security, treatment and reformation. This is the second meaning of "respon-
sible" discussed supra note 123.
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son; (2) establish clearly that society cannot, for its own protec-
tion, tolerate such acts regardless of the reasons back of them,
and (3) rehabilitate the offender if that is possible. These purposes
are all that are hoped for from punishment; the introduction of
the mythical concept of responsibility merely clouds the issue.",
The abolition of the concept of mens rea would not be easy. For
one thing, there is the problem of constitutionality. Early in this cen-
tury, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the abolition of the
insanity defense."7 The Court has reiterated its belief in the "ability
and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil"
as a "core concept" of the law. 38 Many substantive offenses are statu-
torily defined in terms of mental state, e.g., "willfully," "deliberately,"
"with premeditation," "with intent," and so on.
There is also a philosophical reluctance on the part of the legal pro-
fession to abandon a concept as ancient and well-settled as that of
"free will." This reluctance is expressed by Judge Leventhal in Brawner
v. United States:
This cherished principle is not undercut by difficulties, or differences
of view, as to how best to express the free will concept in the light
of the expansion of medical knowledge. We do not concur ...
that the insanity defense should be abandoned judicially ...
because it is at'too great variance with popular conceptions of guilt
or fails to show proper respect for the personality of the criminal.3 '9
Thus, although the concept of mens rea cannot be abandoned, the
separate insanity defense (as stated in Model Penal Code section 4.01)
should be because it adds a second and inappropriate inquiry to the
question of guilt. Although the need and purpose of a separate insanity
defense has been assumed as apodictic, no reason has been articulated
for excusing the "insane" for acts otherwise criminal, except that the
insane person could not form the necessary intent. The concept of in-
tent is included in section 4.02(1) of th& Model Penal Code, which
states that "[e]vidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease
or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant
did or did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense.1340
336. H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRnIINAL DEFENSE 483 (1954) (quoting WIOMORE,
ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY, 743 (1929)).
337. See cases cited supra at note 228.
338. See, e.g., Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952). In United States v. Brawner,
471 F.2d 969 (1972), the court approvingly cited Morrissette and added that the concept of the
lack of "free will" was "both the root of origin" and "the line of growth" of the insanity
defense. 471 F.2d at 936.
339. 471 F.2d at 986.
340. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(1) (1962).
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Model Penal Code section 2.02 states that "a person is not guilty of an
offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently"
with respect to "each element of the offense with which he is charged."34'
Thus evidence of mental disease or defect is admissible under both
sections to reduce or negate certain elements of mens rea necessary
to prove the offense charged. If a criminal defendant can prove that
because of his mental defect he was unable to premeditate a killing,
he could not be convicted of first degree murder. A person charged
with assault with intent to rape could be convicted only of assault if
he showed his incapacity to formulate the specific intent necessary for
rape." ' Although evidence of lack of mens rea in the general sense
of "vicious" or "guilty mind" would no longer totally excuse crime,
as it now does in the insanity defense, lack of mens rea as a specific
mental state necessary for the offense charged would provide a defense.
In addition, to define mens rea as "guilty mind" or "vicious will"
is to go beyond actual mens rea, beyond the various definitions of
crimes, and to deal with general blameworthiness unconnected with
a specific crime: to look beyond intent, knowledge, recklessness, or
negligence and to "search for motives.' ' 34 Finally, to posit a special
class of persons who, by definition, are so different from other per-
sons as to be beyond the law is to ignore modem medical views. Dividing
society into two groups, the wholly sane and the wholly insane, does
not, in light of modern psychiatry, make any sense.3
As for the hypothetical defendant who is suffering such delusions
341. Id. § 2.02(1).
342. In Brawner, Judge Bazelon describes the use of this doctrine to mitigate responsibility.
471 F.2d at 989-99. The doctrine has been called "diminished responsibility" or "partial respon-
sibility." It is more properly dubbed a doctrine of "subjective liability" since it permits the
jury to decide the presence or absence of the elements of mens rea after complete evaluation
of the defendant's mental capacity at the time of the offense. Comment, Mens Rea and Insanity,
28 ME. L. REv. 500, 515 (1977). "Evidence of mental illness would be admissible as to the
mens rea issue to the same limited extent that deafness, blindness, a heart condition, stomach
cramps, illiteracy, stupidity, lack of education, 'foreignness,' drunkenness, and drug addiction
are admissible." Morris, supra note 333, at 519. To this list may now be added "premenstrual
tension." In separate murder trials in British courts last year, two women successfully pleaded
that premenstrual tension had provoked them to carry out their violent acts. N.Y. Times, July
12, 1982, at B12, col. 2.
343. Comment, supra note 342, at 504.
344. Professor Richard C. Allen, Director of the Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Criminology,
George Washington University School of Law, argues that humanity is not divisible into such
"discrete categories." For even the "sickest" mental patient has some consciousness of moral
accountability, some capacity to choose to obey rules, and the "wellest" person has areas of
weakness that narrow his behavioral choices. Allen, The Brawner Rule-New Lyrics for an Old
Tune, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 67, 83. Dr. Sullwold makes the point that the mentally ill do not
differ substantially from the mentally healthy in the ability to control their actions; a "sane"
person often loses self-control and behaves irrationally in a temper tantrum. See supra note 328.
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that he strangles his wife, believing he is squeezing a lemon,3'" his defense
would be that he lacked the specific intent to kill another human being.
From his perspective he was merely squeezing a lemon. He did not
act knowingly, for he did not expect to kill his wife. He did not act
recklessly or negligently because, to his knowledge, his behavior did
not run the risk of causing death to another person. Although under
the current insanity defense rules, this person would also be excused
from culpability, the rules are not necessary to protect him. Lack of
specific mens rea-intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence-would
suffice.34
Conclusion
History reveals the insanity defense as a legal theory in search of
an appropriate expression. Modifications of the M'Naghten rule, the
adoption of the Durham test by the federal courts, and the subsequent
adoption of the ALI test, were all based upon the assumption that
if the insanity defense were cloaked in appropriate terminology, it could
be made to work. The addition of the GBMI defense by some jurisdic-
tions demonstrated that it would not. Finally, the Hinckley trial proved
to the nation that the insanity defense suffers from basic logical defects
that semantic changes cannot cure.
The abolition of the separate insanity defense as a total defense for
criminal behavior, along with the retention of the concept of mens
rea, as exemplified by the Idaho statute, seems most likely to avoid
the problems of the insanity defense, while surviving due process
challenges. As a result of the Hinckley trial publicity, it can be predicted
that Congress and many states will adopt legislation modeled upon
the Idaho statute. If so, the insanity defense will have come full circle,
returning to its origin in Lord Coke's statement four hundred years
ago that without "felonious intent" there can be no crime, and that
a person deprived of reason "cannot have a felonious intent.
347
345. The lemon-squeezing spouse is described in the MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, comment
2 (Tent. Draft No. 4 1955). See also Wales, An Analysis of the Proposal to Abolish the Insanity
Defense in S.): Squeezing a Lemon, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 687, 689 (1976).
346. Comment, supra note 270, at 521.
347. Beverley's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 118, 1121 (K.B.) (1892).
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